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Introduction 1
1 INTRODUCTION
Almost any human activity may be seen as involving some kind of problem
solving activity. Problem solving is one ofthe most recurrent and pervasive
human activities, and the literature on problem solvingis vast. Acountless
number of contributors from a variety of disciplines have engaged in
portraying and prescribing human problem solving. Yet it seems hard to
find an answer to the simple question: What is a problem? The term
problem is so commonly used, in everyday language as well as in the
literature, that it is ordinarily taken for granted that everyone knows it's
meaning (Getzels, 1982). When examining the literature, however, it
appears that a number of different phenomena have been subsumed under
the term problem, and that alternative, metaphorical conceptions of
problems are exhibited.
In everyday language, the term problem is most commonly used with
reference to states of difficulty or external conditions that cause
dissatisfaction. Within the problem solving literature, problems tend to be
viewed as discrepancies, i.e. as differences between some existing or
anticipated situation and some desired situation. In the decision making
literature, in contrast, problems tend to be equated with decision-problems.
Within philosophy, meta science, educational, and creativity research, in
turn, problems are typically viewed as questions raised for inquiry.
Given the ambiguity surrounding the concept of a "problem",it is perhaps
not surprising that the first processes of problem solving, the processes by
which we become aware of and define problems, are the least understood
_(Simon et al., 1987). Problem solving is normally seen to occurvia multiple
stages. For example, Mitroff et al. (1974) see the problem solving process
from a normative viewpoint as composed of four stages: Conceptualization,
Modeling,Problem Solving, and Implementation. Mintzberg, Raisinghani,
and Thåoråt (1976) identify three stages of problem solving from a
descriptive point of view: Identification, Development, and Selection.
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One may divide the different activities or stages of the problem solving
process according to their inherent focus. When in the stages of
Conceptualization or Identification, attention is directed toward the problem
at hand, i.e. toward "the problem of the problem" (Getzels, 1982). These
activities represent the problem oriented phase of problem solving. In this
phase, the existence of a problem is brought to one's attention and
subsequently formulated or defined. While in the latter stages (i.e.
Modeling, Problem Solving, and Implementation in Mitroff et a1.'s terms, or
Development and Selection in Mintzberg et al.'s terms), in contrast, focus
shifts from the problem to its solution, i.e. from "the problem of the
problem" to "the problem of the solution" (Getzels, 1982). This latter phase
may be termed the solution oriented phase of problem solving.
While there is a vast body of studies addressing the solution oriented phase
of problem solving, there are considerably few systematic studies of the
same nature addressing the problem oriented phase (Dillon, 1982; Getzeis,
1982). The difference in attention drawn to the two phases may be
associated with the common view that problems are somehow self-evident,
or thrusting themselves upon us (Eden and Sims, 1979). Following this
view, which reflects a reactive approach to problem solving, it appears more
important to solve problems than to find them.
Several contributors have, however, drawn distinctions between problem
solving and problem finding, and highlighted the importance of the problem
oriented phase of problem solving (e.g., Dillon, 1982; Getzeis, 1982). The
problem oriented phase is as important as the solution oriented phase, as
it represents the initiator of subsequent activities. The outcome of the
problem oriented phase in terms of problems chosen for attention, their
definition, and formulation form crucial determinants of the adequacy and
possible success of subsequent problem solving attempts. The key to
effective and inventive solutions is often the ability to identify where
problems lie and to find interesting problems (Getzeis, 1975).
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, Problem finding represents the very first stage in the problem oriented
I phase of problem solving and embodies the processes by which we become
Laware of a problem. Problem finding is a critical activity, as it determines
which aspects of the environment will be..attended to through problem
solving efforts and, hence, the allocation of limited resources. Problems
represent important activators of action in organizations, and problem
fmding may be seen as a necessary precondition for managerial activity
directed toward organizational adaption (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Lyles
and Mitroff, 1980;Pounds, 1969). In this light, problem solving should be
approached in a proactive, as well as reactive, manner.
So far, contributions addressing problem finding are scarce, and ~Q
integrated body of theory or common conceptual framework has been
--" _-------------_ ..-_.-._
developed (Dillon, 1982). In particular, there is a lack of knowledge
concerning managerial problem finding, i.e. problem finding in the
organizational context. The literature on managerial cognition emphasizes
the latter, solution oriented phases of decisionmaking and problem solving,
whereas initial, problem oriented activities have been under-researched (cf.,
Porac and Thomas, 1989; Smith 1988). As a consequence, there is a
considerable research gap with respect to the critical issue of managerial~ --- ---
problem finding, and there is a continued and pressing need to develop
better understanding ofthe initial phases ofproblem solvingin general, and
in the organizational context in particular. The processes and mechanisms
underlying problem finding need to be explored in order to arrive at a more
comprehensive and inclusive body of knowledge on problem solving.
Purpose of the Study
The aim of the present study is twofold. The first aim is to contribute to a
clarification of the related concepts and phenomena problem and problem
finding. The perspective chosen is from the point ofview of the individual
problem finder. Special attention will be devoted to the objectivist-
subjectivist dilemma concerning the reality of a problem. Furthermore, we
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will discuss critical determinants, modes, and dimensions of problem
fmding, as well as alternative metaphorical conceptionsof problems.
The second aim is to conductan empirical investigation of the impact of
alternative conceptionsofproblemsonmanagerial problem finding. Due to
the small body of research addressing managerial problem finding and
alternative conceptions of problems, the investigation is exploratory in
orientation and aims at theory generation and development of propositions
for further research, rather than rigorous theory testing.
Plan oftke report
The report consists of six chapters and four appendices and is organized as
follows: Chapter two reviews the existing literature and develops a
conceptual framework in which different classes, modes, and dimensions of
problem finding are distinguished. Chapter three presents and discusses
five metaphorical conceptions of problems and concludes with the
formulation of four research questions for empirical investigation. The
methodologicalframeworkchosen and the research designdevelopedfor the
empirical investigation is presented in Chapter four. Chapter five reports
the procedures employed for data analysis and the obtained results.
Findings and their possible implications are discussed in Chapter six.
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2 PROBLEM FINDING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Problem finding constitutes the very first activity or stage encompassed in
the problem solving process, and may be conceptualized as the processes by
which we become aware of a problem. Problem finding is to be
distinguished from problem formulation, which entails activities such as
defining and diagnosing the problem, and generating and selecting among
alternatives for solution. In comparison with problem finding, problem
formulation has received considerablymore attention in the literature (e.g.,
Lyles, 1981,1987; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Lyles and Thomas, 1988;
Ramaprasad and Mitroff, 1984;Schwenk and Thomas, 1983; Taylor, 1974;
Thomas, 1988; Volkema, 1986). Some contributors do not, however,
explicitly distinguish between problem finding and problem formulation
(e.g., Cowan, 1988),while others viewproblem finding as the first stage in
problem formulation (e.g., Herden and Lyles, 1981;Thomas, 1988).
There has been a considerable increase in the attention drawn to problem
finding during the last decade, and problem finding as a research issue
appears to be on the rise. Problem finding represents, like problem solving
in general, a most pervasive and interdisciplinary issue, which has been
examined by a variety of disciplines, e.g. management, organizational
decisionmaking, business policy,creativity research, educational research,
psychology,psychiatry, and sociology.Itis therefore not surprising that the
study of problem finding is rife with competing vocabularies and
perspectives. Besides the term problem finding, which still appears
infrequently in the problem solving literature, a variety of terms have been
used with reference to the very first phase of the problem solving process;
e.g. problem sensing (Allender, 1969; Kaufmann, 1989), problem
identification (Boland and Greenberg, 1988; Dearborn and Simon, 1958;
Herden and Lyles, 1981;Walsh, 1988),problem recognition (Bonge, 1972;
Cowan, 1986),problem discovery (Bass, 1983;Getzeis, 1975,1979),problem
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assertion (Agre, 1982), problem formation (Watzlawick, Weakland, and
Fisch, 1974),and problem construction (Hewitt and Hall, 1973;Kaufmann,
1989).
The meanings attached to the various terms differ,however,often reflecting
differences in the conceptualization of problems, and hence, of problem
finding. Problem finding may, for example, be seen as the first component
of human inquiry (Allender, 1969), as question raising (Arlin, 1975-76;
Artley et al., 1980), as the process of identifying undesired discrepancies
(Bass, 1983; Bonge, 1972; Cowan, 1986; Pounds, 1969), as problem
definition, based on the notion that problems are defined rather than
identified or discovered (Dery, 1984),as a component of creativity (Dillon,
1982;Getzeis, 1973,1975,1979,1982;Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi, 1967),
as the cognitive processes of noticing and constructing meaning about
environmental change as a basis for organizational action (Kiesler and
Sproull, 1982), or as the detection of the need for a new program by
comparing existing and expected future programs (Mackworth, 1965).
It is important to note thus, that the choice of the term problem finding
here is not rooted in any conceptual precedencein the literature, as no such
precedence so far has been established. The term problem finding has,
however, been used by a number ofcontributors (e.g.,Arlin, 1975-76;Artley
et al., 1980; Dillon, 1982; Getzeis, 1973,1975,1979,1982; Getzels and
Csikszentmihalyi, 1967,1976; Jones, 1982; Mackworth, 1965; Malhotra,
1974;Pounds, 1969;and Subotnik, 1985),however with varying meanings.
The presence of a variety of constructs and approaches may seem
unavoidable, as it reflects paradigmatic differences between contributors
whose disciplinary background and training diverge (cf., Astley, 1985).
Nevertheless, the variety ofvocabularies and perspectives makes attempts
to undertake a review and conceptual integration of contributions an
intricate enterprise. Hence, rather than attempting to standardize terms,
we will seek to explore some of the underlying differences between
contributions, which serves the purpose of contributing to a more unified
Problem Finding 7
conceptual foundation for the study of problem finding. This implies that
the review of contributions cannot be separated from the inquiry into the
constructs employed and the approaches chosen.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of central contributions addressing problem
finding, the primary constructs employedwith reference to problem finding,
and the discipline from which problem finding has been approached. The
list is not exhaustive, but attempts to cover the major contributions
addressing either: (1) the conceptof a problem; (2) the processes underlying
problem finding; or (3) the factors affecting problem finding. Both
theoretical and empirical contributions are included. (Contributions
primarily addressing the succeeding processes of problem formulation are
not included.)
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Table 2.1. Contributions addressing Problem Finding
Contribution Constructs
employed
Discipline
Empirical contributions
Allender, 1969 Problem Sensing Educational Research
Arlin, 1975-76 Problem Finding Creativity Research
Artley et al., 1980 Problem Finding Creativity Research
Boland & Greenberg, 1988 Problem Management
Identification
Dearborn & Problem Management
Simon, 1958 Identification
Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976 Problem Finding Creativity Research
Herden & Lyles, 1981 Problem Management
Identification
Ims,1987 Problem Seeking Management
Ivany,1969 Problem Educational Research
Identification
Jones, 1982 Problem Finding Management
Pounds, 1969 Problem Finding Management
Shulman, 1965 Problem Sensing Educational Research
Subotnik, 1985 Problem Finding Creativity Research
Walsh,1988 Problem Management
Identification
(Continued)
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Table 2.1. (cont.)
Contribution Constructs
employed
Discipline
Theoretical contributions
Agre,1982 Problem Assertion Educational Research
Bass, 1983 Problem Discovery Organizational
and Diagnosis Decision Making
Bonge, 1972 Problem Recognition Business Policy
and Diagnosis
Cowan, 1986 Problem Recognition Management
Dery, 1984 Problem Definition Public Policy
Analysis
Dillon, 1982 Problem Finding Creativity Research
Getzels, 1973,1975, Problem Finding Creativity Research
19_79,1982
...-
Getzels & Problem Finding Creativity Research
Csikszentmihalyi, 1967
Hewitt & Hall, 1973 Problem Definition Sociology
and Construction
Kaufmann, 1989 Problem Sensing Psychology
and Constructing
Kiesler & Sproull, 1982 Problem Sensing Management
Mackworth, 1965 Problem Finding Creativity Research
Malhotra, 1974 Problem Finding Management
Raaheim, 1961 Problem Conception Psychology
Skinner, 1984 (Problem Solving) Psychology
Watzlawick, Weakland Problem Formation Psychiatry
and Fisch, 1974
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2.2 ON THE REALITY OF PROBLEMS:
THE OBJECTIVIST·SUBJECTIVIST DILEMMA
The question "What is a problem?" may be approached at severallevels.
At the most fundamental level, it refers to core assumptions about the
reality of problems. Existing contributions on problem finding seem to
reflect a not yet resolved dilemma with respect to this issue. The dilemma
is formed by the conflict between what we will term the "objectivist"
conception of problems on the one hand, and the "subjectivist" conception on
the other. The objectivist-subjectivist controversy is not unique to the
study of problem finding, but represents a longstanding debate within the
social sciences in which the idealized objectivistic paradigm has been
prevailing (cf., Lakoff, 1987; Morgan and Smircich, 1980).
2.2.1 THE OBJECTIVIST CONCEPTION OF PROBLEMS
The objectivist conception of problems reflects the view that reality is a
concrete structure in which problems represent objective entities with an
existence independent of the observer (cf., Morgan and Smircich, 1980).
The environment is seen as teeming with problems that thrust themselves
upon us (cf., GetzeIs, 1982). According to this view, humans are responders
to the environment, rather than active creators of the environment. The
objectivist conception of problems is reflected in the way the term problem
tends to be used in everyday language and in the management literature on
problem solving. For example, Kilmann and Mitroff(1979) and Yadav and
Korukonda (1985) argue that more emphasis should be directed towards
minimizing the Type III error, defined as the probability of solving "the
wrong problem". Kiesler and Sproull (1982) refer to situations in which
managers fail to notice or misinterpret information about "the existence of
a problem". Clinton and Torrance (1986) claim that "accurate identification"
of a problem is a prerequisite for efficient problem solving. Skinner's
(1984) "operant analysis" of problem solving, in which he centers on the
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contingency-shaped behaviors of problem solving, also demonstrates this
view.
The ideas above demonstrate the objectivist conviction that problems "exist",
that "right" and "wrong" problems may be identified, and that there are
"accurate" versus "inaccurate" descriptions of problems. They reflect what
seems to be a common, basic assumption; that an objective self-contained
reality exists, and that "objective knowledge" may be acquired. Phrased
differently, that certain beliefs, assumptions and convictions reflect the
environment more correctly than others (cf., Popper, 1972; Watzlawick,
1984).
2.2.2 THE SUBJECTIVIST CONCEPTIONOF PROBLEMS
According to the subjectivist conception of problems, in contrast, problems
are not objects in the world to be discovered, but labels we assign to given
situations. Problems are viewed as mentally projected categories of events
or situations which cannot be seen isolated from a problem owner. Several
findings support this view (e.g., Eden and Sims, 1979; Herden and Lyles,
1981; Ims, 1987). Eden and Sims (1979) found that in what appears to be
the same situation, different persons perceive different problems. Herden
and Lyles (1981) observed that based on different world views, attitudes,
and personality, individuals arrive at very different conceptualizations of
the same situation. Ims (1987) also identified significant differences in
problem conceptualization among executives presented with the same
events.
These findings, among others, demonstrate that the objectivist conception
of problems implicitly ignores important psychological contributions by the
problem owner. The concept of a problem owner implies that the
phenomenon,problem cannot be strictly externalized. Nadler (1983), for
example, argues that problems exist solely because ofhuman purposes and
aspirations, whereas Eden and Sims (1979) propose that one may not talk
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about problems meaningfully without ascribing owners to them. When
different people see different problems in what seems to be the same
situation, problems cannot necessarily be self-evident.
It is important to note, nonetheless, that problems tend to be experienced
as self-evident by the perceiver, who sees a reality which is unique to him.
What is to become the "realproblem", depends on the perceiver and his or
her way of experiencing and interacting with the environment (Eden and
Sims, 1979). The experienced problem, thus, is a function of the situation
and the interpretative system or frames of reference of the individual
(Herden and Lyles, 1981). Accordingly, the subjectivist conception of
problems focuses on a perceived world entailing perceived problems, and not
a metaphysical world with objective problems independent of a perceiver
(cf., Lakoff, 1987; Rosch, 1978; Watzlawick, 1984).
In line with this perspective, Agre (1982), Dery (1984), and Kaufmann
(1984), among others, emphasize the interventional and intentional aspects
of problem finding. In their view, a prerequisite for perceiving a given
situation as problematic is that the perceiving individual in some way
desires to change it, Le. has intentions and purposes which are related to
the experienced situation (Agre, 1982; Kaufmann, 1984).
2.2.3 RESOLVING THE DILEMMA
One way of resolving the dilemma which is composed of the two conflicting
perspectives, is by viewing problems as perceptual phenomena with varying
degrees of stimulus dependence. We may conceive of problems as varying
along a dimension from extremely stimulus dependent to extremely
stimulus independent. Apparentlyobvious and evident problems represent
probable instances of problems with high stimulus dependence, whereas
problems that seem to be created or invented represent problems with low
stimulus dependence.
Problem Finding 13
The degree of stimuli dependence in problem finding may be associated with
two different, yet closely interrelated determinants of problem finding: (1)
the environmental determinant, and (2) the psychological determinant.
The environmental determinant is composed of stimuli or cues as captured
from the environment. The psychological determinant, in contrast, is
represented by the observer's attention to and interpretation of stimuli. A
similar distinction is made by Dillon (1982), who argues that problem
finding has an existential and a psychological dimension.
One may argue that when problems are partly perceptual constructs, the
two determinants of problem finding are inseparable and cannot be
meaningfully distinguished. Yet, we will argue, a distinction between the
two determinants is of importance. A perceived problem reflects both
environmental aspects as well as psychological ones. Moreover, the two
determinants do not only influence the degree to which problem finding is
likely to occur; their relative influence reflects the mode of problem finding
involved. Consequently, we will make an attempt to conceptually
distinguish between the two - determinants, based on which we will
differentiate between disparate modes of problem finding and classes of
problems.
2.2.4 THE ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANT
No reallife problem exists in complete isolation (Ackoff, 1974). Problem
finding occurs based on the interpretation of stimuli about a situation, i.e.
in a context. Any situation may be characterized as potentially problematic.
A potentially problematic situation may be conceptualized as a situation in
which there are several imbedded potentially problematic elements, each of
which may produce problem finding.
Potentially problematic situations are characterized by a varying degree of
tension. The degree of tension in the situation reflects whether signals are
strong or weak with respect to a potential problem's existence. To be
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noticed, signals not only need to be available to the observer, but also need
to be of a minimum strength to exceed certain thresholds in human
perception. Information processing theories of human cognition suggest
that people tend to notice salient information, i.e. information which is
unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, or unusual (Kiesler and Sproull,
1982). Salient information demands attention, and several contributors
addressing problem finding have focused on the role of saliences of the types
of discrepancies as an important class of environmental triggers to problem
finding (e.g., Bass, 1983; Bonge, 1972; Cowan, 1986; Pounds, 1969). It has
been argued that the information which is sufficiently discrepant to capture
attention, but not as discrepant as to seem irrelevant, will be best conceived,
rather than discounted or forgotten (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). Relevance
of information, however, is an aspect of the environmental determinant
which clearly cannot be viewed as detached from the problem owner. The
quality of relevance is a function of the situation and the perceiver (cf.,
Churchman, 1971).
What is often neglected in the literature, is that in the context of a
potentially problematic situation, problem finding involves not only the
interpretation of elements as problematic, but also the selection among
perceived problematic elements. Phrased differently, problem finding
comprises a sensitivity dimension as well as a selectivity dimension. Any
given situation may entail a number of potentially problematic elements
which may be interrelated and form an experienced system or "mess" of
problems (Ackoff, 1974). An individual will rarely be able to fully
comprehend the problematic situation as a whole, let alone try and
approach it as a whole (Ackoff, op.cit.). He or she may experience several
interrelated problems, but the complexity of functional and causal
relationships may encourage decomposition and generation of simplified
representations rather than holistic solution attempts (Ackoff, 1974;
Salancik and Porac 1986). Solving problems "one at a time" generally seems
easier than "solving them all at once", and a selection process occurs in
which some perceived problematic elements are selected for attention and
solution attempts, rather than others (Ackoff, 1974).
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The selection of problems from problematic situations is an aspect of
problem finding which has rarely been subject to investigation (exceptions
include, Boland and Greenberg, 1988;Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Shulman,
1965; and Walsh, 1988)._Studies of problem solving tend to employ carefully
constructed experimental situations in which a specificproblem is presented
as a problem-for-solution (Shulman, 1965). These experimental situations
differ from "natural" problematic situations in many respects. In a natural
environment, individuals will be exposed to a continuous series of stimulus
situations which are potentially problematic in varying degrees, and based
on which problems need to be selected. No situation alone, however,
qualifies as the sufficient basis for problem finding. The situation may
provide the potentially problematic elements, but the degree to which these,
in fact, are experienced as problematic and produce problem finding resides
in the combination of the situation and the interpreting observer (cf.,
Churchman, 1971).
2.2~5 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANT
The psychological determinant of problem finding lies in the observer's
selective interpretation of cues about problems from the environment. One
of the most central aspects of human cognition is selectivity in perception
and attention. Selective attention and perception has typically has been
attributed to presumed limitations in human information processing
capacity (cf., Allport, 1989; Neisser, 1967; Posner, 1982; Simon, 1957).
Information processing theories of human cognition assume that people
operate on mental representations of the environment which serve as means
for selectivity in attention (Cantor, Mischel, and Schwartz, 1982; Minsky,
1977; Tversky and Hemenway, 1983). Situations are perceived and
interpreted based on mental representations of generic types of situations
which typically include assumptions and anticipations about what elements
are to be included in the situation, what sequence of events is to take place,
as well as causal relationships between elements and events included in the
situation (cf., Anderson, 1983; Gioia and Poole 1984; Lord and Foti, 1986;
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Salanclk and Porac, 1986). Mental representations ofsituations also entail
intrinsic representations ofneeds, interests, and values which form aframe
of reference which selectively directs attention through anticipations and
perceptualreadiness for stimuli (Bruner, 1957). The degree of perceptual
readiness is critical, as it determines whether a given cue from the
environment is captured, noticed and attended to, and hence, the degree to
which potentially problematic elements are perceived and attended to.
In light of problem finding, mental frames of reference play an important
role at two levels. At one level, they affect the framing of potentially
problematic situations, and at the other level, they affect the framing of
problems. The framing ofa potentially problematic situation and its impact
on problem finding have received little attention in the problem solving
literature (exceptions include Boland and Greenberg, 1988;Dearborn and
Simon, 1958; and Walsh, 1988). Theories of social cognition suggest,
however, that frames of reference affect both which aspects of a situation
are perceivedand attended to, as well as which aspects are left unattended
or ignored. People tend to seek information that is consistent with their
own frames or views, and ignore, downplay or disregard conflicting
information (Hogarth, 1987). Frames of reference also affect which
elements are conceivedof as most critical and important (Neisser, 1976).
Perceived importance is of apparent importance to problem finding, as for
an element to be experienced as a problem, it needs to be seen as somehow
important - it has to matter, otherwise it is not a problem. The proposed
intentional and interventional aspect of problem finding (Agre, 1982;
Kaufmann, 1984; Nadler, 1983), is also supported by theories of social
perception, which suggest that perception is guided by opportunities for
action in the environment (Showers and Cantor, 1985). This suggests that
the ways in which the observer's goals, purposes, interests, values and
intentions are represented affect the degree to which elements are
interpreted as problems and the selection and perceived preeminence of
problems.
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One of the fewstudies which explicitly address the framing of a potentially
problematic situation in problem finding is Boland and Greenberg's (1988)
investigation of the impact of organizational metaphors. Their results
_ indicate that when introduced to different organizational metaphors (the
mechanistic or the organic metaphor, cf., Morgan, 1986), subjects saw the
same situation quite differently and identified different problems.
Accordingly,Boland and Greenberg (1988) argue for the stronger position
of the role of metaphorical frames of reference in research on problem
finding, and request further attempts ofidentifying such metaphors and of
exploring their impact.
Given a situation in which the perceiver experiences one or several
problems, however, each problem may be framed in alternative ways.
Alternative ways offraming the problem result in different representations
of the problemand its characteristics. Problem framing has been subject to
extensive investigation, and the importance and effects ofproblem framing
have been demonstrated in numerous studies. The framing ofproblems has
been found to influence, for example, the degree of risk-aversion, perceived
certainty, choice behavior, and perceived value of time (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). One of the major
implications of the literature on problem framing is that how a person
represents a problem in his or her mind represents a critical determinant
of the adequacy of subsequent problem solving efforts (Hogarth, 1987;
Kaufmann, 1989; Simon and Hayes, 1979). Stated differently, various
problem representations differ with respect to the degree to which they
facilitate problem solving. The discovery of isomorphic relationships
between problems, for example, may facilitate problem,solvingand reduce
problem solving difficulty (Simon and Hayes, 1979). Imposing problem
analogies when novel solutions are called for, in contrast, may inhibit
problem solving (Kaufmann, 1989).
The mental framing of situations and problems depends on several
psychologicalaspects. Empirical studies demonstrate that people tend to
frame situations and problems differently depending on their experience
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(Hogarth, 1987). Experience generate frames of reference which guide
selective attention, and has been found to affect the selection of problems
from a situation in which many potential problems are imbedded (Dearborn
and Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1988).
Framing may also depend on stimuli related factors; one of which is data
presentation. The order in which information is presented as well as the
mode of presentation has been found to affect framing, perceived
importance, information search and the focus on various information types
(Simon, 1979).
Besides framing, problem finding has been related to a number of
psychological factors, for example, creativity and cognitive style (Artleyet
al., 1980), education, intelligence, and theoretical and aesthetical values
(Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi, 1967), and individual attributes (Herden and
Lyles, 1981).
An interesting finding which clearly demonstrates the critical importance
of the psychological determinant in problem finding is the observation that
children engage spontaneously in independent problem finding where no
specific problems are given to be solved and without any available feedback
(Allender, 1969).
2.8 MODES OF PROBLEM FINDING
The distinction between the environmental and psychological determinant
of problem finding form basis for differentiating between alternative modes
of problem finding. First, one may draw a distinction between generic
modes of problem finding dependent on the degree to which the processes
involved are automatic or effortful. Secondly, one may discern modes of
problem finding contingent on the generic class of problems involved.
Problem Finding 19
2.3.1 DIRECTED SEARCH VERSUS AUTOMATIC SCANNING
Twogenericmodesofproblemfinding may be acknowledged:directed search
and automatic scanning (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). Directed search may
be conceptualized as a proactive mode of problem finding which is directly
based on intentions and objectives,and which involves deliberate inspection
of the environment in order to identify problems. Directed problem finding
is largely guided by anticipations, and may often be associated with
repetitive or routine problem finding aimed at the identification ofinstances
of known classes of problems. Directed search may, however, be
exploratory in nature and not directed towards any particular class of
problems (Aguilar, 1967;EISawy and Pauchant, 1988).
Automatic scanning, in contrast, represents a direct perceptual process
which is assumed relatively unaffected by intentions, learning, and practice
(Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). Individuals engage in automatic scanning
through continuous information processing and without conscious
awareness. Automatic scanning may therefore be conceptualized as a more
reactive mode of problem finding, in which automatic categorization and
matching processes play an important role. Problem finding may, for
example, occur through the automatic categorization of events and
situations based on salient information, frequency of information, and
imbedded frames of reference.
In everyday life, it seems reasonable to assume that most problem finding
is conducted through a combination of the two polar modes. Automatic
scanning influence inferential, effortful processes (Kiesler and Sproull,
1982). Although we rarely label our activities "problem finding", there are
many situations in whichwedeliberately search for problems. For example,
we may search for obstacles to planned activities, such as going for a
vacation or introducing a new product; or scrutinize financial accounts and
income prospects in order to identify possible liquidity problems or
opportunities for new investments.
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2.3.2 CLASSES OF PROBLEMS
Alternative modes of problem finding may also be discerned dependent on
the generic class of problems involved. Many attempts have been made at
developing a classification framework for organizational and managerial
problems (e.g., Acar, 1984; Ackoff and Rivett, 1963; Cowan, 1988,1990;
Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Dillon, 1990; Maier and Hoffman, 1964; Nadler,
1983; Smith, 1988; Taylor, 1974; Walsh, 1988), but only a few systematic
attempts have been made to develop a generic, domain independent
taxonomy of problems (e.g., Dillon, 1982; Getzeis, 1975,1979,1982; Getzels
and Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Kaufmann, 1989).
Getzels (1975,1979), who approaches problem finding from creativity
research, distinguishes between three classes of problems at the most
general level: presented problems, discovered problems and created
problems. In Getzeis' terms, presented problems are propounded to the
problem solver by others who know the problem's formulation, the method
of solution, and its solution. Discovered problems, on the other hand, are
envisaged by the problem solver, and mayor may not have a known
formulation, a known method of solution, or a known solution. A created
problem, in contrast, does not exist until someone invents or creates it. It
has no previously known formulation, method of solution, nor a known
solution. Between these three categories, however, one may find a number
of problems that differ with respect to what is known and unknown, by the
individual faced by the problem or by others presenting the problem
(Getzels, 1975,1979).
Kaufmann (1989), on the other hand, who addresses problem finding from
psychology, distinguishes between presented problems, foreseen problems,
and constructed problems. According to his taxonomy, the individual is
faced with a difficulty that has to be handled in the case of a presented
problem. In the case of a foreseen problem, in contrast, the individual
anticipates that a problem will be the result if action is not taken to prevent
a certain trend of development. The case of the constructed problem differs
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from the former two, however, in the way that the initial conditions here are
experienced as satisfactory; there is no inherent tension in the situation.
A problemmay be constructed, nevertheless, by comparing the experienced
situation with an imagined, desireable situation in the future (Kaufmann,
1989).
Dillon (1982), in turn, who approaches problem finding from creativity
research, suggests an alternative classification of problems, in which he
distinguishes between evident problems, implicit problems and potential
problems. Dillon explicitly links the three classes of problems to an
existential and a psychologicaldimension ofproblemfinding. These roughly
correspond to the environmental and psychologicaldeterminants ofproblem
finding as conceptualized here. Based on the two dimensions, Dillon
associates the three classes of problems with three different modes of
problem finding; problem recognition, problem discovery, and problem
creation, respectively.
A comparison of the three taxonomies reveals both similarities and
differences which need to be considered in the light of problem finding.
First, Getzels (1975,1979)and Kaufmann (1989) attach different meanings
to the labels "presented" and "constructed" (created) problems. Getzels
conceptualizes presented problems as problems propounded by others,
whereas Kaufmann view ofpresented problems corresponds to what Dillon
(1982) terms evident problems. In our view, what is labelled presented
problems by Getzels (1975,1979), best reflect what may be termed
constructed problem situations - not to be confused with constructed
problems. In a constructed problem situation there is no genuine or
authentic problem owner. When the problem's formulation, method of
solution, and solution is known by others, the presumed problem no longer
represents the focus of attention. In contrast, it is the skill of problem
solving which constitutes the focus and which is at the test. Hence,
constructed problem situations are best associated with contexts in which
the simulated problemowner undertakes problem solvingtraining, and have
little relevance in the context of reallife situations.
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Problems may, however, be presented by others who do not know their most
appropriate formulation, method of solution, or solution. Problem
presentation, in this sense, occurs frequently in organizational settings in
which the means of solution may be possessed by someone else than The
initial problem finder. In this case, the problem may appear evident to the
propounder, but it mayor may not be seen as evident by the person to
whom it is presented; the person to whom it is propounded may dispute its
existence. This notion of problem presentation, however, raises a series of
intriguing questions associated with the ambiguity of problem ownership
and legitimization in organizations (cf., Bartunek, 1984; Cohen, March and
Olsen, 1972; Dery, 1984; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan, 1983; Eden and
Sims, 1979; Jones, 1984; Lyles, 1981; Stafford and Warr, 1985; Volkema,
1986).
Secondly, its worth noting the main criteria based on which Kaufmann
(1989) distinguishes between presented and foreseen problems reflects
whether the problem is experienced at the present or anticipated in the
future. We will question the necessity ofthis distinction in light of problem
finding. When viewing problems as the products of the environmental and
psychological determinants, a problem "appears" in the mind of the problem
owner at the time when cues are noticed and interpreted as problematic.
Problem finding, hence, may refer to events in the past, present, or future.
Actions taken in order to prevent certain developments are based on
presently perceived cues about a problem, and represent attempts directed
at avoiding further, future manifestations. Problems may also be identified
in retrospect. In this case, the individual becomes aware of a problem
which has been neglected or disregarded in the past, and for which
appropriate solutions are presumed no longer available. The mechanisms
involved in retrospective problem finding may, however, often be associated
with hindsight (cf., Elster, 1983; Hogarth, 1987).
Another issue of importance is the ways in which constructed problems are
conceptualized, i.e. the presumed role of the environmental and
psychological determinant. Kaufmann (1989) asserts that problem
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construction is based upon situations in which there is "no inherent tension".
One may question the degree to which it is meaningful to talk about
situations with no inherent tension. In our view, any realistic situation
conveys a minimum degree of tension, and may thus, be conceptualized as
potentially problematic. Given the absence of tension, the situation or set
of cues will be neglected and ignored by the perceiver. The degree to which
the tension is strong and apparent, however, may vary. Consequently, we
will suggest that problem creation best is associated with situations in
which there is no apparent tension.
In summary, Getzels (1975,1979), Kaufmann (1989), and Dillon (1982)
utilize dissimilar criteria in order to discern different generic classes of
problems. We believe, however, that in order to meaningfully distinguish
between generic classes of problems, the two determinants of problem
finding need to be taken explicitly into account. A slightly modifiedversion
of Dillon's (1982) framework is adopted for this purpose.
Table 2.2 illustrates the adopted taxonomy.
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Table 2.2 Taxonomy of Problems and
Modes of Problem Finding
Class of
Problems
Commensurable
Constructs
Modeof
Problem
Finding
Activity
Evident Presented Problem Perceiving
Recognition the
Situation
Implicit Discovered Problem ,Probing
Discovery the
Situation
Potential Created Problem Inventing
Constructed Creation the
Problem
Evident Problems
Evident problems stem from strong environmental tension and situations
in which there is little ambiguity in interpreting elements as problematic.
Hence, the signals which lead to problem recognition are clear and
unconfusing. Examples of problem recognition are the detection of
unexpected declines in sales or a sudden negative cash flow in the case of
a private enterprise. In the case of an individual, the refusal of an
anticipated education grant or an unexpected, high expense may represent
. evident problems to be recognized.
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Implicit Problems
Implicit problems are discovered based on weak, conflicting or discontinuous
environmental cues. Hence, implicit problems are not evident, but emerge
from probing the situation, which may take the form of directed search for
problems. Examples ofimplicit problems at the organizationallevel are an
eroding market share or customer misuse of a product discovered through
careful market analyses.
Created Problems
Problem creation involves active invention of a problem based on no
apparent tension in the situation. Here, the psychological determinants of
problem finding are of crucial importance. Problem creation may be
conceptualized as inventive framing of a situation, for which intentions and
experiences may constitute important psychological aspects. In the
organizational context, problem creation may occur as, for example, the
search for a new product to satisfy invented or imagined needs of customers,
not yet fulfilled byexisting products. Many technical developments directed
toward the consumer market are the products of problem creation, rather
than the outcome of attempts to solve evident problems. Examples are
products presented to satisfy needs which potential customers never realized
they had, e.g. "the walk-man" and "the personal computer".
It is important to note, however, that the boundaries between evident,
implicit, and potential problems are fuzzy rather than clear-cut. The
relative influence of the environmental and psychological determinants of
problem finding cannot be categorized into three clear intervals, but vary
along a continuum. Figure 2.A. illustrates the positioning of each mode of
problem finding according to the relative influence of the two determinants.
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Figure 2.A. The Environmental and Psychological Determinant
in Problem Finding
The Environmental
Determinant
High
Problem Recognition
(Evident Problems)
Problem Discovery
(Implicit Problems)
Problem Creation
(Potential Problems)
Low
Low High
The Psychological
Determinant
2.3.3 CONTRIBlITIONSADDRESSINGDIFFERENT MODESOF
PROBLEM FINDING
In the literature, distinctions between the three modes of problem finding
are rarely explicit. In particular, there is a common lack of distinction
between problem recognition and discovery. As a result, contributions are
not easily classified according to the three modes, and the following
classifications are suggestive and indicative.
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It appears, however, that the class of problems and the mode of problem
finding addressed vary dependent on the discipline from which problem
finding is approached. Contributions from the management sciences have
typically centered on problem recognition and discovery, rather than
creation. Contributions from educational research, in contrast, tend to focus
on problem discovery, whereas problem creation has received the most
attention from the field of creativity research. In the following, we will
briefly review some of the contributions.
Problem Recognition
Theoretical contributions addressing problem recognition include Kiesler
and Sproull's (1982) examination of managerial problem sensing from the
perspective of social psychology; Cowan's (1986) descriptive process model
of problem recognition; and the discussion by Bass (1983) of problem
recognition from the perspective of organizational decision making.
Pounds' (1969) investigation, which represents one of the earliest and most
well-cited studies of problem finding, address problem discovery. Pounds
defines problems as discrepancies between "what is" and "what ought to be".
Based on observation and interviews ofmanagers, Pounds propose that five
classes of problems are employed for problem finding: historic models,
planning models, other people's models, extra-organizational models, and
theoretical models.
The five classes of models proposed by Pounds (1969) do not comprise a
coherent taxonomy, however, as some models may represent instances of
others. For example, other persons may induce historic models, planning
models, extra-organizational models, and theoretical models - hence
representing "other peoples models" in Pounds' terms. Planning models, in
turn, might be theoretical in nature or generated by comparison with other
organizations (extra-organizational models). Hence, the set of models
proposed by Pounds reflects a lack of distinction between two inherent
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dimensions. The first dimension concerns whether the comparison
performed is internallyas opposed to externally oriented, whereas the latter
relates to the source of the model selected for comparison. Internally
oriented comparison implies that the present performance of the
organization is contrasted with previous or planned performance.
Externally oriented comparison, in contrast, signifies that the (previous or
expected) performance of the organization is contrasted with another
organization or with selected theoretical models. The source of such models,
in tum, represents a dimension associated with model selection. Yet, from
the perspective of the problem finder (the manager), other people's models
do not represent genuine or legitimate sources of problem finding unless, in
fact, adopted by the manager him or herself.
Problem Discovery
Many of the contributions addressing problem discovery stem from
educational research (e.g., Allender, 1969; Ivany, 1969; Shulman, 1965).-
Within these disciplines, problem finding tends to be seen as a component
ofhuman inquiry and conceptualized in terms ofprobing information about
a situation. For example, Ivany (1969) investigated the effect of varying
the amount and kind of information on the strategy of inquiry. Allender
(1969) studied a group of children who were presented with the role game
"I am the Mayor", and measured problem discovery through various scores
for requests for additional information. Shulman (1965), in tum, observed
differences among individuals in their patterns of inquiry based on
personality, motivational, and intellectual differences.
Several of the investigations of managerial problem finding adopt a
situation-probing perspective which might reflect that problem finding is
conceptualized in terms of discovery rather than recognition. For example,
Dearborn and Simon (1958) investigated departmental affiliation as a
contributing factor to selective attention in the problem finding of
executives. The results suggest that problem finding is selectively directed
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towards the activities and goals of the department to which the executive
is affiliated. Yet, it may be objected that important nuances in the data are
neglected as a result of the simplistic data categorization procedures
employed.
Walsh (1988) proclaims to conceptually replicate and extend Dearborn and
Simon's (1958) investigation by exploring the effects of "belief structures",
not only on problem finding, but also on the use and request for information
about the situation presented. The operations and classification framework
employed, however, appear ambiguous and arbitrary, and based on the
obtained results one may question the degree to which authentic belief
structures are revealed. Moreover, despite attempts at contesting Dearborn
and Simon's (1958) results, more similarity than dissimilarity is revealed.
The results from Dearborn and Simon's (1958) and Walsh's (1988)
investigations, nevertheless, suggest that executives tend to direct their
attention toward areas with which they are familiar - however not at the
cost of overlooking other areas.
Boland and Greenberg (1988), in tum, focused on the impact of different
organizational metaphors (the organic and mechanistic metaphor). Their
findings indicate that when presented with different metaphorical
frameworks for analyzing a situation, subjects emphasized different aspects
of the situation, discovered different problems, and proposed different
solutions. A critical limitation of this study, however, is the reactivity
threats associated with the techniques employed for eliciting response, in .
which subjects' attention was rigorously directed toward explicit features of
the metaphors rather than toward the case material presented.
Problem Creation
Contributions addressing problem creation tend to stem from creativity
research, in which problem creation is conceptualized as an element of
human creativity. Theoretical discussions ofproblem creation include Dillon
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(1982),Mackworth (1965), and Getzels (1973, 1982). Amongothers, Arlin
(1975-76),Artley et al. (1980), and Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976)
have addressed problem creation empirically.
Arlin (1975-76)and Artley et al. (1980)presented a group of subjects with
a set of commonobjects and instructed them to ask questions about them,
singly or in combination. Arlin (1975-76)observed relationships between
problem creation quality and quantity. She concluded that the "successful"
problem creator is characterized by adaptive flexibility, elaboration, and
formal operational thinking. Artley et al. (1980) observed that problem
creation ability (quantity) was positively correlated with verbal creativity
and negatively correlated with the quality of created problems (measured
as the weighted average of questions according to various intellectual
products categories, cf., Guilford, 1959,1965,1967,1971). Getzels and
Csikszentmihalyi (1976) explored problem creation in art students, and
observed that several problem creation characteristics, such as
manipulation, exploration and unusualness, were correlated with the long
term artistic success of the art students.
Although these studies shed light on crucial, cognitive aspects underlying
creativity, the findings have limited merit in understanding the
fundamental processes underlying and triggering problem creation in the
context of managerial problem finding. In light of managerial problem
finding, it is of interest to explore the conditions under which problem
creation most likely occurs and the processes involved in managerial
problem creation. Furthermore, one would have to carefully evaluate the
criteria based on which problem finding "success" and "quality" should be
evaluated.
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Conclusions
The review of contributions, although not exhaustive, indicates that there
are sizeable gaps in the research literature addressing managerial problem
finding. Most contributions addressing managerial problem finding exclude
explicit distinctions between the three modes, and further research efforts
are required with respect to any of the modes of problem finding. Of special
importance, we will argue, are attempts to explore problem finding in
contexts in which problems are not presumably apparent due to strong
stimulus dependence, and in which the psychological determinant of
problem finding is critical. The studies by Dearborn and Simon (1958),
Walsh (1988), and Boland and Greenberg (1988) offer some important
indications of the role of background knowledge and frames of reference in
explaining differences in problem finding. These studies need be further
replicated and extended by including additional, carefully selected factors
which may account for systematic differences in problem finding.
2.4 DIMENSIONSOF PROBLEMFINDING
Problem finding represents a multi-faceted process which entails several
dimensions. We will propose that three different, yet closely interrelated
dimensions of problem finding should be conceptually distinguished: (1)
problem sensitivity, reflecting the amount or number of problems perceived;
(2) the locus of attention, reflecting the allocation of attention between the
internal and external environment; and (3) the pattern of inquiry, reflecting
the allocation of attention over different domains. The first dimension
refers to the degree of sensitivity and selectivity in problem finding, whereas
the two latter refer to the areas from which problems are selected.
Problem Finding 32
2.4.1 PROBLEM SENSITIVITY
Problemsensitivity represents a quantitative dimension ofproblem finding,
and .refers to the degree to which cues about potentially problematic
elements are interpreted as problems. In the literature, problem sensitivity
has typically been addressed in a "oneproblem at the time" manner (e.g.,
Pounds, 1969; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Cowan, 1986), i.e. in terms of
whether or not cues to problems result in problem finding.
Reallife problems do not, however, present themselves in a consecutive
manner. As individuals we are faced with situations entailing series of
potentially problematic elements, based on which selection must occur.
Accordingly,problem sensitivity needs to be addressed in the context of
simultaneous exposure to multiple potentially problematic elements. In this
context, problem sensitivity is of crucial importance due to the limited
problem handling capacity of individuals and organizations. Given
limitations in the capacity of handling problems, it is vital to attain an
"optimal" level of problem sensitivity, based on which the potentially most
relevant problems are identified and attended to. If the sensitivity of
problems is very low, important cues to problems may be overlooked or
ignored. Veryhigh problem sensitivity, in contrast, may result in ''problem
overload", i.e. situations in which the number and magnitude of problems
found exceed the handling capacity of the individual and organization. A
situation of problem overload, in turn, may result in "inaction".
Problem sensitivity has received the most attention from contributors
addressing problem finding from educational and creativity research.
Shulman (1965, p.261) defines problem sensitivity as "the number of
imbeddedpotentially problematic elements to which the subject reacted in
the inquiry situation". His findings suggest that problem sensitivity is
affectedby the strategies of inquiry employed; dialectical inquirers exhibit
higher problemsensitivity, employa wider range ofinformation and exhibit
more flexible and reflective inquiry strategies than do didactic inquirers
(Shulman, 1965,p.259).
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Arlin (1975-76)and Artley et al. (1980) related problem sensitivity to the
quality of problems found (measured in terms of intellectual products
categories, cf., Guilford, 1967), and observed a negative correlation; The
subjects who exhibited lowproblem sensitivity, identified problems of high
quality, and vice versa. The measure of problem quality employed is
assumed to reflect the degree to which the problems sensed approach the
"generic"or "general"problem,rather than surface characteristics associated
with the problem.
Of the contributions addressing managerial problem finding, very few
explicitly address problem sensitivity as conceptualized here. For example,
Dearborn and Simon (1958)excludedproblem sensitivity by instructing the
subjects to specify the perceived most important problem only. The
investigations by Walsh (1988) and Boland and Greenberg (1988), in
contrast, reveal factors that influence problem sensitivity. Walsh's (1988)
findings suggest, although not noted explicitly, that managers with a
"marketing" belief structure identified a higher number of problems in
average, than did managers with "human relations", "accounting", or
"generalist" belief structures.
Boland and Greenberg (1988)observed that problem sensitivity was affected
by the organizational metaphor employed. The organistic metaphor resulted
in an increase of approximately 29% in problem sensitivity as compared to
the mechanistic metaphor, and an increase of approximately 50% as
compared to the decision metaphor, which was employed as a control
condition. These findings demonstrate that several psychologicalaspects
influence the degree to which we sense problems.
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2.4.2 LOCUS OF A'ITENTION
Individuals and organization operate in a context, and the allocation of
attention between the internal and external environment may be of crucial
importance to the ability to identify relevant and important problems. The
distinction between the external and internal environment is particularly
apparent in the organizational context, where one may distinguish between
the environment in which the firm operates and its internal functions and
activities. The distinction applies to the individualIevel as well, at which
one may draw a distinction between the external environment, including
other persons, and the internal factors such as the actions, behavior and
dispositions of the individual.
Based on the notion of stimulus dependence in problem finding, problems
may be internallyas well as externally induced. Theories of causal
attribution (e.g., Kelley, 1967; Heider, 1958) highlight the tendency to
attribute unpleasant and negative events to the environment, whereas
positive and desired outcomes and events tend to be attributed to own
behavior, actions, or personality traits. Findings indicate, however, that we
tend to observe other people's behavior more readily than our own, and
hence, see others as more causal than ourselves (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982).
These findings might indicate that we are inclined to search for and
attribute problems to the environment, and to downplay or ignore our own
dispositions and actions as important sources of problems.
In the organizational context, the importance of the locus of attention is
highlighted in a recent investigation by D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990), who
uncovered significant differences in the locus of attention of managers in
surviving and failing firms. Their findings suggest that under normal
circumstances, managers of surviving firms pay equal attention to the
internal and external environment. When faced with an externally induced
crisis, however, managers of surviving firms allocated more attention to the
external environment than did the managers of failing firms. While the
successful firms focused on the critical aspects of the environment, failing
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firms engaged in maladaptive crisis denial. These findings are consistent
with the crisis denial theory (e.g., Billings, Milburn and Schaalman, 1980;
Schwartz, 1987; Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987; Reilly, 1987; Starbuck,
Greve and Hedberg, 1978) and the normative strategy literature, which
suggest that managers of failing firms are insensitive to changing external
conditions and focus on internal methods that were successful in the past,
rather than on the need to change and adapt.
D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990) focus on externally induced crises, however,
and it is important to note that internally induced crises plausibly call for
a different locus of attention. Their focus is in line with contributions
addressing crisis denial behavior, which also emphasize externally induced
crises. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the findings that
managers will not change their focus of attention in response to a crisis will
apply to internally induced crises as well. What is highlighted by D'Aveni
and MacMillan (1990) and by the crises denial theory (e.g., Billings et al.
1980; Schwartz, 1987; Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987;Reilly, 1987; Starbuck,
Greve and Hedberg, 1978), hence, is the need to adapt the locus of attention
in response to changing internal and external conditions.
Very few investigations have been conducted ofmanagerial problem finding
in which external and internal cues about problems were presented
simultaneously. Exceptions include Boland and Greenberg (1988), Dearborn
and Simon (1958), and Walsh (1988). Boland and Greenberg (1988)
observed that the locus of attention in problem finding differed dependent
on the organizational metaphor introduced. Their findings suggest that
while the organic metaphor focused attention on the environment, the
mechanic metaphor directed attention to the internal processes of the
organization.
Dearborn and Simon (1958) do not explicitly address the locus of attention
in problem finding. Yet, their data (reproduced in appendix, op.cit.) suggest
that executives affiliated with sales departments identified problems more
Problem Finding 36
closely associated with the external environment, than did executives from
other departments (production, accounting, and others).
Walsh (1988) explicitly distinguishes between internal and external
management problems by adding these categories to the traditional
functional categories. We consider this procedure highly ambiguous and
disputable, however, as problems within the other domains may be
classified accordingly. Hence, the two categories are better employed as
alternatives to the traditional functional categories. Their fmdings suggest,
nevertheless, that executives with "marketing" belief structures identified
a significantly (p<.05) higher number of external management problems,
than did executives with "human relations", "accounting-finance", or
"generalist" belief structures.
In summary, the literature highlights the importance of the locus of
attention in problem finding and reveals a few factors which may affect this
dimension of problem finding.
2.4.3 PATTERN OF INQUIRY
The pattern of inquiry in problem finding reflects the specific areas from
which problems are selected for attention. The crucial importance of this
dimension is demonstrated by, among others, Boland and Greenberg (1988),
who observed that the pattern of inquiry in problem finding affected the
range of solutions considered, and hence, the possibilities of success in
solution attempts.
Several factors which affect the pattern of inquiry in problem finding have
been revealed. Dearborn and Simon's (1958) suggest that the departmental
affiliation of executives affect the areas in which they perceive the most
important problem. Walsh (1988) suggests that managers tend to focus on
their own areas of concern, but do not overlook other domains. Boland and
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Greenberg (1988), in tum, observed differences in the pattern ofinquiry in
problem finding dependent on the organizational metaphor induced.
In summary, only a limited number of contributions address managerial
problem finding along the dimensions proposed. Hence, there is a continued
need for research aimed at identifying and exploring factors that may
account for systematic differences.
2.5 SUMMARY
Despite the efforts ofa number ofcontributors, the initial phases ofproblem
solving remain the least understood. The absence of an integrated theory
of problem finding partly stems from the variety of disciplines from which
problem finding has been approached. Contributors have applied various
constructs with varying meanings to address problem fmding, often due to
paradigmatic differences in approach. Furthermore, they have focusednot
onlyon different classes ofproblems, and different modes ofproblem finding,
but also on different dimensions inherent in problem finding.
We have proposed a conceptual framework, based on which the various
contributions may be distinguished and classified. First, we have suggested
a resolution to the objectivist-subjectivist dilemma with respect to the
reality of problems by introducing the notion of stimulus dependence. The
idea of stimulus dependence implies that two determinants of problem
finding are distinguished: the enuironmental and the psychological
determinant. The relative importance of the two in the particular
problematic situation determines the degree of stimuli dependence in
problem finding.
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Secondly, based on the relative influence of the two determinants, three
classes of problems and three modes of problem finding may be
differentiated: (1) evident problems, which are recognized; (2) implicit
problems, which are discovered; and (3), potential problems, which are
created.
Thirdly, we have proposed three inherent dimensions of problem finding:
problem sensitioity, reflecting a quantitative aspect of problem finding; the
locus of attention, reflecting the allocation of attention between the internal
and external environment; and the pattern of inquiry, reflecting the
allocation of attention over different domains. Whereas the first dimension
refers to the degree of sensitivity and selectivity in problem finding, the two
latter refer to the areas and domains from which we select problems.
Although scarce, the literature highlights the importance of the three
dimensions and strongly signifies the need for further investigations.
In summary, the conceptual framework proposed attempts to provide a
structure formeaningfully classifying and integrating existing contributions
according to the aspects, modes, and dimensions of problem finding
addressed. The classification of contributions also serves the purpose of
identifying gaps in the research literature, and thus, areas in which
continued research is called for. The review of contributions reveals that
the specific approach chosen and the phenomena addressed need be made
more explicit in order to arrive at an integrated and comprehensive theory
of problem finding.
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3 ALTERNATIVE PROBLEM CONCEPrIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Most contributions addressing problem solving seem to be based on the
implicit and unquestioned assumption that people hold a co~mon
conception of problems, and that problems can be understood as unitary
phenomena. The term problem tends to be used non-reflectively and non-
consciously (Agre, 1982). The answer to the question "What is a problem?"
is assumed self-evident, and very few explicit attempts have been made at
I,
providing an answer. Yet, when reviewing the \terature, different generic
conceptions of problems are reflected, some of which may be seen as
instances of others. The conceptions of problems most frequently exhibited
in the literature are: (1) the discrepancy conception, (2) the difficulty
conception, (3) the decision conception, (4) the question conception, and (5)
the conception of problems as opportunities for improvement.
The presence of alternative conceptions of problems is of importance to our
understanding of problem finding, as these reflect different assumptions
about "what is a problem" - as opposed to "what is the specific problem".
Alternative conceptions ofproblems, hence, reflect different "generic images"
of problems, which, in turn, may stem from paradigmatic differences
between contributors and disciplines.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the five conceptions of problems, examples of
conceptual definitions of problems according to each of these, as well as
examples of disciplines in which the specific conceptions are demonstrated.
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Table 8.1 Alternative Problem Conceptions
Problem
Conception
Example
of definition
Demonstrated
in discipline(s)
Discrepancy Problems defined as
the difference between
some existing situation
and some desired
situation.
Difficulty Problems defined as
states of discomfort or
undesirable conditions
where there is no
ready response.
Decision Problems defined as
situations in which one
or several choices have
to be made.
Question Problems defined as
questions raised for
inquiry and
consideration
Opportunities Problems defined as
perceived
opportunities for
improvement.
Management,
Psychology.
Every-day
language,
Psychology ,
Management
Decision
Sciences
Educational
& Creativity
Research,
Philosophy
& Science
Policy
Analysis
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The presence of alternative, generic conceptions of problems indicates that
the events and situations labelled problems represent a fuzzy category, Le.
a category with unclear boundaries and gradations ofmembership (Lakoff
1987). The different _problem conceptions also depict problems
metaphorically and may be conceptualized as alternative problem
metaphors. It has been argued that human cognition is largely
metaphorically structured (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), and considering
Boland and Greenberg's (1988) and Schon's (1979) promotion of the role of
metaphors in problem finding and solution, it is intriguing to note that
.different problem metaphors have not yet been subject to systematic
investigation, nor attracted more explicit attention. The only extensive,
systematic discussion related to generic problem metaphors is Dery's (1984)
examination ofsome of the common meanings attached to the term problem.
The five conceptions of problems differ, yet they are not mutually exclusive:; y
Each of the five conceptions embodies central aspects characterizing any
problematic situation. Discrepancies, difficulties, decisions, questions, and
opportunities for improvement may be conceptualized as central properties
of the category of events and situations labelled problems, or as necessary,
defining characteristics of problems (cf., Lakoff, 1987). For example, Agre
(1982) argues that to point to a problem implies evaluating a situation or
elements of a situation as inneed of change, Le. that there is a discrepancy
between what is and what should be from the point ofview of the perceiver.
Given a perceived discrepancy between the experienced and desired
situation, an opportunity for improvement is envisioned through resolution
of the discrepancy (Dery, 1984). Furthermore, a situation needs to be
characterized by difficulty to be labelled a problem, either in terms of
finding a solution or defining the problem (Agre, 1982). Questions may be
raised with respect to the problem at hand, and with respect to possible
solutions and actions. The defining and solution processes, in tum, require
decisions to be made among alternative interpretations and attempts of
solution (Dery, 1984).
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Metaphors systematically affect comprehension by highlighting and
directing focus toward certain aspects of the situation, and by hiding or
down-playing other aspects (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Accordingly,we
willview alternative conceptionsofproblems as frames of reference through X
which a potentially problematic situation may be approached and
interpreted. Alternative problem conceptions may be transposed into
inquiry frames through which directed search for problems is performed. l-
In this sense, the different metaphorical conceptions induce different
observational goals which motivate strategies for inquiry (Cohen and
Ebbesen, 1979;Showers and Cantor, 1985). An observational goal specifies
the motivation of inquiry and affects the encoding, retrieval, and
interpretation ofinformation (Showersand Cantor, 1985). Instances of any
of the conceptions might be evoked at any time. The conditions that favor
the evocation of a specificconceptionin a given situation, however, are not
yet known.
Alternative problem conceptions also attach "linguistic descriptors" to
problems. As problems constitute ambiguous and equivocal phenomena,
their labels represent powerful devices for the framing of a situation or X
event. Interpretation and selectivity in attention in assumed to be
centrally tied to language and labels (Dutton, 1988),and the labels attached
to each of the conceptions activate the prompting of a situation for some
qualities rather than others. The importance of labelling is demonstrated
by among others Dutton (1988),whoobserved that managers skillfully and
deliberately applied labels to issues in order to attract issue involvement.
In the following,wewill elaborate on each of the alternative conceptionsof
problems and suggest some implications for our understanding of problem
finding.
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3.2 PROBLEMS AS DISCREPANCIES
- The conception ofproblems most frequently exhibited in the literature is the
one of problems as discrepancies (Dery, 1984), and the defining quality of a
problem most contributors will agree on is likely to be the one of a
discrepancy. The discrepancy conception is demonstrated in numerous
studies on problem finding and solution (e.g., Billings et al., 1980; Bonge,
1972; Cowan, 1986; Kaufmann, 1989; Kilmann and Mitroff, 1979; Merton,
1961; Pounds, 1969; Smith, 1988; Thomas, 1988).
Pounds (1969) defines a problem as the difference between some existing
situation and some expected or desired situation. Bonge (1972) defines the
general nature of problems as the failure to attain some value or standard
which indicates that goals are not being achieved or that opportunities are
being missed. Raaheim (1964) suggests that a problem situation may be
conceived of as a deviating member of a series of situations with which the
individual has previous experience and has classified as similar. Bass
(1983) suggests that "a problem exists when something is not as it should
be". Another instance of the discrepancy conception is the one of problems
as the difference between an initial state and a goal state, which represents
a common conception within the psychologicalliterature on problem solving
(e.g., Anderson, 1985).
Instances of the discrepancy conception differ with respect to the inherent
view of the reality of problems. On the one hand we have the extreme
objectivist conception in which the discrepancy itself is considered the
problem. This implies that the discrepancy as such is equated with the
problem and, thus, externalized. It should be noted that in this case the
conception is no longer metaphorical, but literal (cf., Ortony, 1986). Pounds'
(1969) process model of problem finding demonstrates this view. Pounds
proposes that managers identify problems by comparing models of expected
or desired outcomes with models of the current state of the firm and its
environment. In his view, model selection represents the key issue to
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understand problem finding. This view implies that problems are
structurally predefined, and that problem finding is a strict routine
operation performed by comparison of selected models (Dery, 1984).
Accordingly, any detected discrepancy constitutes a problem. Although
Pounds include the phase labelled "discrepancy selection" in his process
model, this phase is not conceptualized as the process of distinguishing
"problems"from "not problems". In contrast, discrepancy selection is seen
as an issue of problem priority.
In most discrepancy conceptions of problems, however, a less extreme
position is taken in which the psychological contribution of the problem
owner is stressed (e.g.,Kaufmann, 1989;Kiesler and Sproull, 1982;Thomas,
1988). This implies that a given discrepancy in itself is not seen as
constituting a problem. Discrepancies which attract attention and are
experienced as somehow important due to the observer's goals, values,
expectations and preferences, however, constitute potential problems. It
may appear as if Pounds (1969) takes these psychological factors into
account by highlighting the importance of model selection. In his terms,
however, the selection of models for comparison form an explicit activity
preceding the initial awareness of a discrepancy. Hence, his model doesnot
include the notion of a potential problem, e.g. the "spontaneous"
identification ofdiscrepancieswhichmeaning and relevance are experienced
as ambiguous by the observer.
Although the psychologicaldeterminant tends to be taken into account, it
seems that the discrepancy conception reflects an orientation toward the
environmental determinant of problem finding - and that the discrepancy
itselftypically is conceptualizedas the problem (e.g., Cowan, 1986,Pounds,
1969). This may imply that the discrepancy conception of problems best
relates to evident and implicit problems, rather than to potential problems;
and to problem recognition and discovery,rather than to problem creation.
This assumption is supported by Kiesler and Sproull's (1982) finding that
discrepancies are likely to be identified by recognition of evident saliences,
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As stressed byKaufmann (1989),however,perceived discrepancies may also
represent created (potential) problems which derive from the comparison of
an existing situation and an imagined goal state in the future.
3.3 PROBLEMSASDIFFICULTIES
The term problem originates from the Greek word problema which meant
bulwark, shield, or impediment to action (Hattiangadi, 1978). The
conception of problems as difficulties captures the original meaning of the
term problem, and represents a common conceptualization of problems
which is frequently reflected in everyday language as well as in the
management and psychologicalliterature on problem salving (Dery, 1984).
Two instances of the conception of problems as difficulties should be
distinguished. On the one hand, we have the notion of "a difficulty" as a
noun, and on the other hand we have the notion of the quality "difficult",
The conception of problems as difficulties may refer to either of these: i.e.
to a difficulty, or to a situation or event characterized by difficulty. In the
first instance, the noun difficulty may be equated with an undesirable
condition or event, which, in turn, may be conceptualized in terms of one or
several discrepancies. This may imply that the discrepancy and difficulty
conceptions of problems should be equated. No study to date, however, has
tested this assumption empirically.
FollowingAgre (1982),an undesirable situation which has nothing difficult
connected with it is not a problem. Stated differently, to qualify as a
problem the processes of formulation and solution have to be judged as
somewhat difficult (Agre, 1982). This latter notion of "being difficult"
represents a defining characteristic of a problem, rather than a structural
definition of a problem as an undesirable situation.
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The quality of "being difficult" has been associated with lack of structure.
Mintzberg et al. (1976) classify problems along a dimension from "well
structured" to "ill structured", reflecting various degrees of difficulty.
Kaufmann (1989) suggests that ill-structuredness is composed of the three
independent dimensions novelty, complexity and ambiguity, which may vary
independently of each other. Following Kaufmann (op.cit.), novelty stems
from the absence of relevant knowledge or experience (i.e. perceived lack of
familiarity); complexity relates to limited capacity ofhandling large amounts
of information; and ambiguity refers to the difficulties of handling
conflicting information, such as preferences and alternatives of action.
Based on this notion of difficulty, it seems apparent that the psychological
determinant plays a major role. The issues of novelty, complexity, and
ambiguity, as defined by Kaufmann, are all closely associated with the
interpretations and cognitive capabilities of the problem owner. Hence, a
novel problem may be transformed into a familiar one by analogy and by
discoveringproblem isomorphs (Simon and Hayes, 1979); a complex problem
may be simplified by utilizing bounding strategies limiting the scope of
information considered (cf., El Sawy and Pauchant, 1988); and a problem
characterized by ambiguity may become less ambiguous by limiting the
types of information considered and by resolution of conflict.
The notion of difficulty as a defining characteristic of problems is not shared
by all. For example, Skinner (1984) argues, in a response to the open peer
commentary on his operant analysis of problem solving, that "thereare easy
problems and there are hard ones, and they are both problems" (p.609). We
will suggest, however, that problems are characterized by varying degrees
of difficulty. An "easy" problem is characterized by a low degree of
difficulty, whereas a "hard" problem is characterized by a high degree of
difficulty. Accordingly, given the absence of perceived difficulty, what is
labelled a problem better corresponds to an unambiguous "task" or standard
operation procedure.
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It seems reasonable to assume that we rarely explicitly distinguish between
"a difficulty" and "something difficult" in our daily use ofthese terms. Yet
they may be usefully differentiated at the conceptuallevel. Perhaps most
importantly, it appears that the idea of "a difficulty" primarily points to
perceived structural properties of the environment, whereas the idea of
"something difficult" rather seems to refer to the observer's capabilities of
handling and resolving the perceived difficulty. Stated differently, it seems
that the notion of "a difficulty" best refers to "the problem of the problem",
whereas the concept "difficult" better relates to "the problem of the
solution".
In both instances, the conception of problems as difficulties has a negative
connotation. We do not normally wish to face barriers or impediments to
action. We may, nevertheless, overestimate the actual barriers to a
solution, i.e. "make a big problem out of something", or downplay the
difficulty of a solution, i.e. view the difficulty as "not much of a problem"
(Agre, 1982). When taking the negative connotation of "a difficulty" into
account, it seems that the difficulty conception ofproblems best is associated
with problem recognition and discovery, rather than creation. When
incorporating the quality of "difficulty" into this conception, however,
difficulties may be created, as well as recognized and discovered, by the
deliberate imposition ofnovelty, complexity, and ambiguity (cf., Kaufmann,
1989).
3.4 PROBLEMSASDECISIONS
The conception of problems as situations calling for a decision is another
common problem conception. In the decision making literature, we rarely
find any explicit distinctions between "problems" on the one hand and
"decision problems" on the other; problem solving and decision making tend
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to be equated (Dery, 1984; Smith, 1988; cf., Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and
Theoret, 1976; Taylor, 1975).
The lack of a clear distinction between the two concepts is understandable.
Both concepts refer to thought processes, and the cognitive referents of the
two concepts largely overlap. Cognitive activities such as generating
alternatives and performing choices may be seen as part of either "decision
making" or "problem solving" (Smith, 1988).
Several contributors have, however, drawn a distinction between decision
making and problem solving. Simon et al. (1987) suggest that the term
problem solving tends to be used with reference to the activities of fixing
agendas, setting goals, and designing actions, whereas the term decision
making tends to be employed with reference to the activities of evaluating
and choosing among alternative actions. Smith (1988, pp. 1489-1490) argues
that "decision making implies that a choice will be made, suggesting that
alternatives exist or will be identified (...) In contrast, problem solving is
directed at the resolution of a problem". Starbuck (1983) proposes that
problem solving is defined by its origin - a problem, whereas decision
making is defined by its ending - a decision. A similar view is adapted by
Dery (1984, p.23), who asserts that "a problem is not the equivalent of a
decision problem; only a defined problem is".
When making decisions, the fundamental question may be thought of as
"which alternative should be chosen?",while the question facing the problem
solver is "how can I solve the problem?" (cf., Smith, 1988, p. 1490). This
view is supported by the observation that decision making not always
involves problem solution (Cohen et al., 1972). Decisions are often based on
choice opportunities without any problems solved - except for the problem
of the solution. The decision maker may perceive a decision when an action
is taken, even when this action does not solve a problem (Starbuck, 1983).
Decision making may also be motivated by other types of ambiguous stimuli
for action (Mintzberg et al., 1976), such as crises and standard operation
procedures.
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Ackoff (1974) suggests that decision making involves problem solving
whenever the decision maker is in doubt about which choice to make. This
implies that problem solving is seen as embedded in decision making. The
opposite viewpoint may seem just as appropriate. Decision making
constitutes a crucial component of any problem solving process. Problems
cannot be solved without decision making at several stages throughout the
problem solving process. During problem solving, choices have to be made
with respect to whether the identified problem should be attended to or
ignored; how it should be defined or formulated; who should be involved in
the problem solving process; which information should be gathered; which
alternatives should be considered; and finally, which alternatives for action
should be chosen. Hence, the problem solving process generates a subclass
of problems - "choice problems", which are not to be confused with the
problem initiating the solution process, and which is attempted solved.
The conception of problems as decisions, nevertheless, implies that choice
activities of the problem solving process are emphasized. This may suggest
an inherent solution orientation rather than problem orientation, i.e. that
"the problem of the solution" rather than "the problem of the problem" is
focused. This orientation, in turn, may result in premature generation and
evaluation ofalternatives for solution, which may affect the possible success
of solution attempts.
The conception of problems as decisions may be related to all the three
modes of problem finding. Situations calling for a decision may be evident,
implicit, as well as potential. A distinction should be made, however,
between repetitive and non-repetitive decisions. In the case of repetitive
decision problems, standard operation procedures are often applied which
specify the line of actions involved in the decision making process, as well
as appropriate solutions (cf., Gioia and Poole, 1984). In this instance, one
may question the degree to which genuine problem solving is involved, or
whether the standard operation procedures rule out the elements of problem
solving by eliminating the "difficulty"originally associated with the decision
problem (cf., Ackoff, 1974).
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In the case of a non-repetitive decision problem, in contrast, no standard
operation procedures are pre-established. Hence, the decision maker faces
the true "decisionproblem" of what choice to make.
3.5 PROBLEMS AS QUESTIONS
Any given problem may be seen as a question to which we search for an
answer. Webster's (1968, p.1807) defines a problem as "a question raised
or to be raised for inquiry, consideration, discussion, decision or solution"
(quoted by Getzeis, 1982). The conception of problems as questions is
demonstrated in philosophy and science, as well as within educational
research and creativity research (e.g.,Allender, 1969;Arlin, 1975-76;Artley
et al., 1980; Getzeis, 1982; Mackworth, 1965). Within philosophy and
science, problems are often posed as questions for theoretical speculation
and empirical investigation. Here, problems are not seen as obstacles or
undesirable conditions to be avoided, but goals in themselves (Getzels,
1982). The processes ofanswering a question, however,has to be associated
with a certain degree of difficulty. A question to which there is a self-
evident and obvious answer does not constitute a genuine question.
Problems do not present themselves as questions, but for any situation in
which a given problem is perceived, several questions may be posed
representing alternative ways of comprehending the problem. The specific
type and structure of the question formulated has implications for
subsequent problem solving activities. InGetzeis' (1982, p.38) terms: "The
question that is asked is the forerunner of the quality of the solution that will
be attained".
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Getzels (19S2,pp.3S-39)demonstrates this through the followingexample:
"An automobile is travelling on a deserted country road and
blows a tire. The occupants of the automobile go to the trunk
and discover that there is nojack: They define their dilemma
by posing the problem: "Wherecan weget ajack ?". They look
about, see some empty barns but no habitation, and recall that,
several miles back they had passed a service station. While
they are gone, an automobile coming from the other direction
also blows a tire. The occupants of this automobile go to the
trunk and discover that there is no jack. They define their
dilemma by posing the problem: "How can we raise the
automobile?" They look about and see, adjacent to the road,
a barn with a pulley for lifting bales of hay to the loft. They
move the automobile to the barn, raise it on the pulley, change
the tire, and drive off, while the occupants of the first car are
still trudging toward the service station.
The causal comment could be, "What a clever solution!" The
more fundamental observation would be, "What a clever
question!"
Different questions, hence, represent alternative ways of posing the
problem. A problem initially stated as "weare facing declining sales", may
be posed as "why are sales declining?", "how can the sales decline be
reduced?", or in a more solution oriented manner; "in what way can
marketing efforts be improved to increase sales?". While the first question
directs attention toward identifying the causes ofthe experienced decline in
sales, the second question directs attention toward the generation of
plausible means of increasing sales, independent of actual causes. The last
question, in contrast, implies that failed marketing efforts are seen as the
probable cause of declined sales, consequently narrowing the scope of
attended solutions.
When conceptualizing problems as questions, it becomesclear that problems
are relative to the problem owner and have no ontologically independent
existence as such. Questions are constructed and posed by individuals
based on their perception of the environment and reflect their desires for
inquiry and intervention.
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We do not become "aware" of questions; questions are the products of
conceptualization. Questions are implicit or potential, rather than evident.
Thus, it seems that the conception of problems as questions best is
associated with problem creation and problem discovery, rather than
problem recognition. This assumption is offered support by examining the
literature in which the question conception of problems is reflected. Most
empirical studies based on the question conception ofproblems have studied
problem discovery and creation. For example, Allender (1969) studied
problem discovery, while Arlin (1975-76), Artley et al. (1980), and Getzels
and Csikszentmihalyi (1971,1976) investigated problem creation. Questions
may, nevertheless, be of a repetitive nature, thus reflecting problem
recognition.
3.6 PROBLEMSASOPPORTUNITIES
Problems and opportunities tend to be conceived of as opposites or different
types ofentities (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1976; Cowan, 1986). While problems
typically are conceived of as negative and involving possible loss,
opportunities tend to be conceived of as positive, controllable and involving
potential gain (Jackson and Dutton, 1988). Dery (1984) makes an
interesting twist to the distinction between problem and opportunities by
introducing the conception of problems as opportunities for improvement.
In his view, problem finding implies pointing to an opportunity, or what is
interpreted as an opportunity. (Dery 1984, p.10). Thus, problems and
opportunities may be conceived of as complementary concepts.
Jackson and Dutton's (1988) findings support this notion. Opportunities
and threats have several perceptual features in common; they are both
typically perceived of as urgent and stressful and characterized by difficulty,
conflict of resolution, and perceived pressure to act (op.cit.). Moreover, like
problems, opportunities are perceived and have owners.
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Following Dery (1984), most problems, if not all, may be framed as
opportunities for improvement, and most opportunities may be framed as
problems. Perceived problems point to opportunities for improvement,
whereas opportunities point to possibilities of deterioration.
The idea of reciprocity between the two concepts, however, does not apply
to all instances ofproblems and opportunities. For example, it appears less
meaningful to label the problems of over-population and environmental
pollution opportunities, although the recognition of these problems may
represent a prerequisite for possible improvements. Similarly, it appears
less appropriate to label the opening ofa newmarket a problem rather than
an opportunity, although the activities necessary for entering the new
market may call for extensive problem solving.
Nevertheless, in many instances problemsmay be framed as opportunities
for improvement. Of possible importance here, is that the opportunity
conceptionhas a clear positive connotation. Although opportunities may be
externally as well as internally induced, however, the dominant conception
of opportunities seems to be that they are inherent in or presented by the
environment, rather than actively created. Hence, in retrospect one may
conceive of opportunities that have been missed. The idea of missed
opportunities may seem legitimate, but is often the result of hindsight
rather than the recognitionof"objectivelyexistent" opportunities in the past
(cf., Elster, 1983;Hogarth, 1987).
We may conceive of two instances of opportunity perception. First,
opportunities for improvement may be identified by deliberately reframing
a problem. Secondly, opportunities may be identified where there is no
apparent problem. Kaufmann's (1989) conception of problems as the
difference between some existing situation and some future, imagined and
desired state of affairs corresponds to the latter instance of opportunity
perception. In this case, opportunity perception is often the result of the
identification of newalternatives for action. This might imply that
opportunity perception is closely related to problem creation.
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3.7 SUMMARYAND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Although most contributors addressing problem finding and solution tend
to assume that people hold a common conception of problems, the literature
reveals that alternative, generic conceptions QfJ~.rQ~!ems~~~~Q_i_~~~The
five conceptions which appear most frequently in the literature are: the
discrepancy conception, the difficulty conception, the decision conception, the
question conception, and the opportunity conception.
We have argued that although the five problem conceptions differ, they are
not mutually exclusive, but reflect important aspects of most conceivable
problematic situations. Hence, they represent alternative inquiry frames
through which a potentially problematic situation may be interpreted.
The most apparent difference among the five problem conceptions relates to
their inherent connotation. While the discrepancy and difficulty conceptions
have a negative connotation, the opportunity conception has a positive
connotation (cf., Jackson and Dutton, 1988). The conceptions of problems
as decisions and questions, in contrast, appear to have a neutral
connotation. Hence, ifwe position the five conceptions of problems along a
positive-negative dimension, the conceptions of problems as discrepancies
and difficulties represent one point of extremity, whereas the conception of
problems as opportunities represents the other.
The differences in inherent connotation may have implications for problem X
finding along the three dimensions proposed. First, considering problem
sensitivity, one may, in accordance with the crisis denial theory (Staw,
Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981;Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1978), expect
a tendency to avoid or ignore perceived negative elements compared to
perceived positive elements. This might imply that the conceptions with a
negative connotation may produce low problem sensitivity in comparison
with the conceptions with a positive connotation.
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Secondly, taking attribution theory into account (e.g., Kelley, 1967; Heider,
1958), one may expect that problem conceptions with a negative connotation
promote an external rather than internallocus of attention, and vice versa.
No studies to date, however, have systematically investigated these
assumptions.
Another important aspect relates to the phases of the problem solving
process to which the different problem conceptions best relate. It appears
that while some of the conceptions reflect a problem orientation, other
reflect a solution orientation. The discrepancy conception ofproblems seems
to be the one most closely associated with the problem oriented phase. A
discrepancy points to the existence of a potential problem, based on which
we search for means of reducing or eliminating the discrepancy. The
difficulty conception, in contrast, may be associated with both phases. A
difficulty may point to a problem, whereas the quality of "difficulty" refers
to the absence of a ready response. The decision conception of problems, in
turn, directs attention toward the activities of choosing between alternative
actions and solutions, i.e. toward the solution oriented phase of problem
solving. The conceptions of problems as questions and opportunities,
however, are not as readily positioned. Questions may refer to the nature
of a perceived problem, alternatives for solution, as well as to the choice
among alternatives for solution. Opportunities, in turn, may be associated
with the reframing of a perceived problem, as well as with new options for
action. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that due to these
differences, among others, alternative conceptions of problems may affect
problem finding.
Most importantly, the five problem conceptions reflect different
metaphorical images of problems - although in some instances literal
similarity or equation between phenomena is inferred. The presence of
alternative, metaphorical problem conceptions has critical implications for
our understanding of problem finding by providing different views of what
is to be found through the enterprise of problem finding.
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As a result, there is a need to investigate the degree to which and how I Jf:!
alternative problem conceptions affect problem finding along the three j
dimensions proposed. No study to date has attempted this, so no
precedents have been set. Due to insufficient theoretical and empirical
foundation, it is therefore premature at this point to formulate rigorous
hypotheses concerning the possible impact ofdifferent problem conceptions.
It should be stressed here, thus, that the present empirical investigation is
in "the context ofdiscovery", rather than in "the context ofjustification" (cf.,
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1981). Accordingly,the investigation is highly
explorative in orientation, and aimed at inductive theory generation and
development of propositions for further research, as opposed to rigid
hypothetical-deductive theory testing.
In line with the explorative orientation, wewill proposea set offour general
research questions addressing managerial problem finding as basis for the
empirical investigation.
Research Questions
(1) Will alternative problem conceptions affect problem ~ensitivity-?
Phrased differently; will some problem conceptions be more generative
than others and stimulate more numerous ideas about problems ?
(2) Will alternative problem conceptions affect the allocation of att~n
between the internal and eft_~'[TULlenvironment, i.e. will some problem
conceptions facilitate an external locus of attention, whereas other
facilitate an internal locus of attention?
(3) Will alternative problem conception affect the pa,J!!!,.",l!U:!!:quiry in
problem finding, i.e. will some problem conceptions lead to increased
focus on specific d.p~, whereas other domains are down-played or
overlooked?
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(4) What is the relatJ.2!Y1hipbetween alternative problem conceptions in
terms of their impact on problem finding? Should some problem
conceptions be conceptually equated? Do the different conceptions
appear to form certain clusters with respect to the ways in which they
affect problem finding along the three dimensions proposed?
By exploring these questions, our intention is to shed light on a set of
under-researched, not to say neglected, phenomena, and to contribute to a
more unified and comprehensive theory of problem solving.
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4 MEæHODOLOGY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to explore the proposed research questions, several methodological
requirements must be specified. First, the empirical design must
encompass a stimulus situation which embodies a potentially problematic
situation relevant to managerial problem finding. We have previously
defined a potentially problematic situation as a situation in which several
potentially problematic elements (possiblecues to problems) are imbedded,
each of which may result in problem finding. The stimulus situation
represents the environmental determinant ofproblem finding, and in order
to test for effects and perform valid comparisons, subjects should be
presented with the same stimulus situation. Secondly,a sufficient number
of eligible subjects are required. These need to be introduced to different
conceptions ofproblems as basis ofproblemfinding. Hence, a procedure for
inducing different problem conceptions as metaphorical frames of inquiry
has to be developed. Thirdly, there is a need for triggers to initiate
problem finding based on the presented stimulus situation and problem
conceptions. Finally, a method for measuring problem finding along the
three dimensions is required.
4.2 OVERVIEW
An experimental study was performed in which a homogeneous group of
subjects (200 undergraduate students in business administration)
participated. The subjects were presented with a potentially problematic
situation in the form of a written case description.
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Subjects were told that they had just been hired as an internal consultant
and advisor to the management of the firm depicted in the case material.
Each subject was randomly assigned to two task instructions, each reflecting
a given problem conception, based on which subjects made written accounts
of important discrepancies, difficulties, decisions, questions, or
opportunities. This procedure resulted in groups of approximately 80
subjects presented with any given problem conception. Detailed design
features are elaborated in the following.
4.3 THE STIMULUSSITUATION
A prerequisite of problem finding is the presentation of situation in which
a series ofpotentially problematic elements are imbedded (cf., section 2.2.1).
In order to segregate the effects of different problem conceptions, each
subject should be introduced to an identical stimulus situation. In order
to control for the specific impact of the situation, however, two alternative
stimulus situations were developed, out ofwhich each subject was presented
to one.
Stimulus situations were developed in the form of written case descriptions
based on actual information about existing companies available fromvarious
business journals. One of the firms depicted represents one of Norway's
major building contractors, whereas the other is a recently established firm
offering personal computers and tailored software to the educational
market. Each case description gives a depiction of the history and current
situation of the firm as presented by two sources: the firm's management
and an independent consultant. Attempts were made at presenting the
information in a realistic manner in order to simulate the complexity of an
organizational environment. Cues of problems with varying strength were
encompassed in order to offer potential ofrecognition, discovery, as well as
creation of problems. Specific names and other details suitable for
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identification were changed to prevent recognition. Case descriptions were
approximately four pages long.
4.4 SUBJECTS
In order determine the required sample size, the following parameters were
specified: (1) the level ofsignijicance (alpha), which indicates the probability
of error in rejecting the null hypothesis; (2) the power of the test of
significance (1 - beta), which indicates the probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true; and (3) the critical effect
size, which is given by "the effect of interest" divided by the standard
deviation of dependent variables (Kraemer and Thiemann, 1987).
Although one may want to choose a level of significance at 0.01 and a power
of the test of significance at 0.99, this is usually inappropriate as the
required number of subjects will be prohibitive (Kraemer and Thiemann,
1987). By convention we have set alpha to 0.05. As the present research
is primarily oriented towards revealing possible differences between groups,
the power of the test of significance should be as high as possible, and
I-beta is set to 0.99.
In order to specify the critical effect size, "the effect of interest" and
standard deviations of dependent variables need to be specified. The effect
of interest reflects the magnitude of effects required for the results to be of
importance, interest, and perceived relevance (Kraemer and Thiemann,
1987). With respect to three dimensions of problem finding investigated,
the effects of interest are not readily specified. Hence, we have based the
specification on indications of feasible effects obtained from a pilot study in
which ten subjects participated. The pilot study also served the purpose of
providing indications of the standard deviations involved, based on which
the required sample size may be specified.
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The ten subjects who participated in the pilot study were post graduate
students in Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration. The treatments and procedures employed
correspond to the primary study.
Results obtained from the pilot study indicate that one may expect
aggregated differences of up to approximately one problem statement
between groups with respect to problem sensitivity. Hence, the effect of
interest in problem sensitivity was specifiedto an average difference ofone
problem statement between groups. With respect to the locus of attention
andpattern of inquiry, preliminary results indicate that groups differ with
up to approximately 10%and 5%,respectively. The effects ofinterest in the
locus of attention and pattern ofinquiry was defined accordingly (measures
are described in Section 4.7.)
The critical effect size (eES) is givenby the effect ofinterest divided by the
standard deviation obtained from preliminary results (Kraemer and
Thiemann, 1987) and was estimated as follows:
Problem Sensitivity
Effect of interest 1
CES= = =0.50
Obs. St. Dev. 2
Locus of Attention
Effect of interest .10
CES= = =0.55
Obs. St. Dev. .18
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Pattern of Inquiry
Effect of interest .05
CES= = = 0.50
Obs. St. Dev. .10
As the direction of effects is not pre-specified, two tailed tests are required.
Based on specification of the critical effect size (CES), as reported above, the
required sample size was assessed by tables prepared by Kraemer and
Thiemann (1987). When setting alpha to 0.05 and I-beta to 0.99, groups of
approximately 80 subjects are required in order to test for effects on the
three dependent variables simultaneously. By letting each subject serve in
two experimental groups, a total sample of approximately 200 subjects is
required. The assignment of subjects to two experimental groups serves at
the same time the purpose of controlling for differences between subjects
which may represent threats to the statistical conclusion validity ofresults,
cf. section 4.5.
Since there would be considerable obstacles to and efforts involved in
attracting a total of 200 managers to participate in the study, a substitute
sample of 200 undergraduate students in Business Administration at the
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration was selected.
The subjects had undertaken an average of three years of training in
business administration at the time ofthe experiment. The age of subjects
ranged between 20 and 33 years, with a mean of 23 years. Subjects had an
average of 16,3 months of work experience. Of the 200 subjects 74 were
women. One of the major advantages of the student sample, besides
availability, is the homogeneity ofsubjects, which reduces threats associated
with random heterogeneity of subjects (Cook and Campbell, 1979). As to
obtain an indication of the external validity of results, however, the study
was replicated with a sample of 29 executives attending a management
development problem (cf., section 6.2.4).
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4.5 TREATMENTS
The treatments developed attempt to impose specificmetaphorical problem
conceptions as frames of inquiry or observational goals in problem fmding.
Treatments were developed as task instructions which simultaneously
imposed different problem conceptions and triggered problem finding.
Subjects were told to assume the role of the new managerial advisor of the
firm depicted in the case material and to prepare for the first meeting with
its management by making explicit accounts of - dependent on the specific
task instruction - important discrepancies, difficulties, decisions, questions,
or opportunities.
The task instructions represent triggers to directed search for problems.
This mode of problem finding was chosen for investigation, as it represents
an explicit activity which is easily triggered by instructions. In order to
investigate automatic scanning, in contrast, which represents an integrated,
non-explicit activity with no conscious awareness, a different and non-
directive methodological approach would be required. This would also be
associated with a series of intractable methodological problems, which are
not present when investigating directed search.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the task instruction developed for each of the
five problem conceptions.
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Table 4.1 OverviewofTask Instructions
Problem Task Instruction
Conception
Discrepancy Give an account of important discrepancies between
the actual situation and the preferred situation of the
firm, from your point of view.
Difficulty Give an account of important difficulties facing the
firm now and in the future, from your point ofview.
Decision Give an account of important decisions the
management of the firm now faces with respect to its
present and future business, from your point ofview.
Question Give an account of important questions which should
be raised concerning the firm's present and future
situation, from your point of view.
Opportunity Give an account of important opportunities for the
future business of the firm, from your point of view.
As illustrated, the task instructions do not include the term problem. This
approach is chosen in order to avoid any possible interference with what
may be subjects' own conceptions of problems - if any. Thus, treatments
are developed to impose specific conceptions of problems in a rigid and
constricted manner, and by presenting the metaphoricallabel associated
with each of the problem conceptions.
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Byletting each subject serve in twoexperimental groups, a between-subjects
design is combined with a within-subject design. This approach reduces
potential treats to statistical conclusionvalidity due to differences between
subjects and serves the purpose of controlling formanipulation success (cf.,
section 5.2).
Based on a sample size of 200 subjects presented with two out of five
possible treatments, the size of treatment groups averaged 80 subjects.
(n) (j) (200)(2)
nj » = = 80
(J) (5)
Il.i
n
J
J
- Average size of treatment groups
- total sample size
- number of treatments assigned per subject
- number of treatment groups
4.6 PROCEDURES
The experimental material presented to subjects was composed of the
followingelements:
a) introduction text and task instructions (one and two)
b) case description (stimulus situation), four pages
c) response sheet for task instruction one
d) response sheet for task instruction two
e) background information form (to specifycovariates sex, age and
number of months work-experience)
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The experimental material was assigned in a class setting after prior
coordination with the professor in charge. Subjects were given general
instructions about how to participate and asked not to discuss the material
or in any other way cooperate during the experiment. Subjects were also
informed that the material each subject received wouldbe different, either
in the case material presented or in the tasks required to be performed.
As each subject served in two treatment groups, there were a total of ten
possible combinations of treatments.
JI 51
= = 10
jl (J -j)1 21 (5-2)1
~j - number ofpossible combinations oftreatments
J - number of treatments assigned per subject
J - number of treatment groups
All possible combinations of treatments were employed. After rotating the
order in which treatments were presented over alternative stimulus
situations, the total number of experimental sets totalled 40. Each
experimental set represents one of the (20) possible combinations of
treatments in combination with one of the two alternative stimulus
situations.
Methodology 67
JI (j) (s)
Jj.= ----- 51 (2) (2)= = 40
jl (J -j)1 21 (5-2)1
~ja - number of experimental sets
J - number of treatments assigned per subject
J - number of treatment groups
S - number of stimulus situations
The experimental material was distributed randomly after prior systematic
shuffiing of the different experimental sets in order to avoid giving subjects
sitting close to each other similar material. This resulted in an even
distribution of stimulus situations and task instruction combinations across
sexes. Obtained treatment groups vary in size between 77 and 82 subjects.
The experiment was completed during a 45 minutes class session.
4.7 DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES
The dependent variables of interest are the three dimensions of problem
finding to which the research questions refer: (1) problem sensitivity; (2) the
locus of attention; and (3) the pattern of inquiry.
4.7.1 PROBLEM SENSITIVITY
Problem sensitivity was operationally defined as the number of problem
statements generated by subjects. Problem statements represent one class
of observable manifestations of problem finding, and have been employed as
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measures of problem sensitivity by, among others, Boland and Greenberg
(1988), Herden and Lyles (1981), and Walsh (1988).
The accounts produced by subjects comprise one or several problem
statements. With very few exceptions, subjects produced orderly accounts
in which each problem statement was easily discerned, e.g. by numbering.
Most problem statements were composed of one or two sentences.
Two examples of problem statements based on the discrepancy treatment
are:
"Sales have not been as high as expected";
"Turnover has increased, but net profits are reduced - hence, costs have
increased. "
In order to perform comparisons between groups, the average number of
problem statements represent the employed measure ofproblem sensitivity.
4.7.2. LOCUS OF A'ITENTION AND PATTERN OF INQUIRY
The dependent variables termed locus of attention and pattern of inquiry
reflect two levels of the selectivity of attention. The locus of attention in
problem finding represents an aggregated level which reflects the allocation
of attention between the external and internal environment. Hence, the
locus of attention in problem finding was operationally defined as the degree
to which attention was directed toward the external environment as opposed
to internal, functional activities. The pattern ofinquiry in problem finding,
in contrast, represents a lower level which refers to the allocation of
attention to different domains. Here, a series of measures are called for,
each reflecting the degree to which a specific domain of inquiry is attended
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to. When investigating the pattern ofinquiry, we have chosen to focus on
the allocation of attention to different internal, functional domains.
As a basis for measurement, a classification structure was developed
including a total of 19 external and internal domains ofinquiry relevant to
managerial problem finding and the context depicted in the case material
(cf., Table 4.2). Six domains represent the macro environment, four
domains represent the microenvironment, whereas nine domains represent
internal functional activities of the firm. The classification framework is
based on Porter's (1985)overviewofprimary and support activities related
to the value chain of the firm (internal domains), and the external domains
included in an industry analysis (external domains). The classification also
encompasses the major domains included in Dearborn and Simon's (1958)
and Walsh's (1988) investigations, and Cowan's (1990) classification
structure of organizational problems.
The accounts given by subjects were content analyzed, and constructs were
extracted and classified accordingto the domain to which they best referred.
This approach was chosen as it gives a nuanced measure of the allocation
of attention in problem finding in comparison with direct classification of
single problem statements. Single problem statements tended to include
constructs with reference to more than one domain ofinquiry, hence their
classification appeared highly ambiguous.
Based on the developed classification structure, the locus of attention in
problem finding was measured in terms of the proportion of constructs
classified to the external (domain groups one and two)and internal domains
(group three), respectively. The pattern ofinquiry, in tum, was measured
in terms of the proportion of constructs allocated to different internal
domains.
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Table 4.2 gives an overview of the domains employed in the classification.
The classification form employed and examples of codings are reproduced
in Appendices A and B.
Table 4.2. Classification Structure Internal and External
Domains of Inquiry
Group I :Macro environment
Demographic factors
Economic factors
Physical factors
Technical factors
Cultural factors
Political factors
Group II:Micro environment
Legislation
Market
Competition
Supply
Group III : Internal Functions
Human Resource Management
Organization
Strategy
Finance
Technology Development
Inbound Logistics
Production & Productline
Outbound Logistics
Marketing & Sales
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4.8 TEST OF INTER RATER RELIABILITY
Due to the extensive amount of coding involved, test of inter-rater reliability
was limited to a random sample of 10% of the total sample (20 subjects).
The sample comprised approximately 160 problem statements and 280
constructs for classification. The co-rater was a female, post-graduate
student and research assistant at the Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration.
Test of inter-rater reliability was performed byestimating the frequency of
identical ratings and by correlation analysis (Pearson Correlation
Coefficient)between ratings. Conventional analysis ofinter-rater reliability
by the estimation of the coefficient kappa (Cohen, 1960) was considered
inappropriate due to the classification procedures involved, in which the
number of items eligible for categorization vary over observations and
between raters.
With respect to the number of problem statements recorded, 92.14% of
ratings were found identical. The majority of the remaining ratings differed
with one unit. When comparing the classification of constructs to different
domains ofinquiry, 77.64% ofratings were found identical. The correlation
between direct ratings across the 19 domains employed in the classification
is estimated at .7726, whereas the correlation between the proportions of
constructs allocated to different domains average approximately .89.
Although higher inter-rater agreement would have been preferred, the
observed discrepancies between ratings may be explained in terms of the
variability in the number ofitems (constructs) categorized (among subjects
as well as between raters), as well as by the high number of possible
categories (domains) to which a given construct might be categorized.
Taking these aspects into account, the observed inter-rater agreement may
be considered satisfactory.
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5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The present chapter presents the procedures employed for analyzing data
and the obtained results. First, analyses are performed in order to
determine: (1) whether manipulations were successfully implemented, i.e.
whether different treatments in fact produced significant differences in
response, and (2)whether there were interaction effects between treatments
beyond the separate effects oftreatments. In subsequent sections, data are
analyzed to explore the formulated research questions.
5.2 TEST OF MANIPULATION SUCCESS
In order to evaluate the success of manipulation, we need to test the
statistical null-hypothesis that the population group means ofthe dependent
variables are equal. In the present design, several quantitative (interval)
variables are assumed dependent on one qualitative (categorical) variable,
for which analysis of variance is eligible. Analysis of variance requires
certain assumptions to be.satisfied: (1) normal distribution of observations
for the dependent variables, (2) homogeneity of variance across treatment
groups, and (3) independence of error associated with any pair of
observations.
The assumption of normality was tested byestimating the mean, standard
deviation, kurtosis and skewness of distributions, as well as by the
Kolmogorov-Smimov Goodness of Fit Test (K-S). Results indicate only
moderate departures from normality, which has been shown not to affect the
statistically robust F-test in the analysis ofvariance (Cohen, 1969;Iversen
and Norpoth, 1987;Beheffe, 1959).
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Tests of homogeneity of variance (Cochran's C and the Bartlett-Box F)
indicate that this assumption is satisfied (p < .03) for all dependent
variables.
Results demonstrate significant differencesbetween groups with respect to
the dependent variables: (1) problem sensitivity, measured in terms of the
number of problem statements (F=10.145, Df.=4, p<.001); (2) the locus of
attention, measured in terms of the proportion of constructs classified to
internal, functional domains (F=12,451,Df.=4,p<.OO1),and (3) the pattern
of inquiry, measured in terms of the proportion of constructs allocated to
different functional areas. Significant differences were identified with
respect to the followingdomains: Organization (F=11,496, Df.=4, p<.001),
Strategy (F=10.144, Df.=4, p<.OO1),Finance (F=17.017, Df.=4, p<.OOl),
Technology Development (F=4.373, Df.=4, p<.037), and Production &
Productline (F=3.104,Df.=4,p<.032). The presence ofa series of significant
differences between groups indicates that manipulations were successfully
implemented.
5.3 TEST OF INTERACTIONEFFECTS
Since each subject was assigned to two treatments simultaneously, we need
to test for the effects over and beyond the separate effects of treatments
(Iversen and Norpoth, 1987). Tests were performed by the ANOVA
procedure employing a multi-variate data setup in which each case
represented a given subject's response to each of the treatments. No
interaction effects between the two treatments were detected with respect
to any of the dependent variables at the 0.05 level of confidence. The
absence of observed interaction effects indicate that subjects differentiated
between treatments, and that the impositionofsimultaneous treatments did
not interfere with the response to separate treatments.
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5.4 PROCEDURES ANDRESULTS
In order to explore the research questions, we need to compare the group
means of the dependent variables. Tests at the aggregated level (cf.,
previous section) indicate the presence of significant differences between
groups. In order to explore the indicated differences, multiple comparisons
between means is performed employing the Scheffe procedure (cf., Scheffe,
1959). Seheffe's test includes the F-test, and is a conservative procedure
which allows for complicated comparisons. Amultiple comparison procedure
is chosen as we wish to detect differences between specific groups, rather
than comparing group means to the grand mean. The advantage ofmultiple
comparison procedures over traditional t-tests relates to an increase in the
critical value k, indicating the probability of error in rejecting the statistical
null-hypothesis associated with each of the pair-wise comparisons (cf.,
Iversen and Norpoth, 1987).
As moderate departures from normality in the observations were detected.
results from the analysis ofvariance are verified by the nonparametric Chi-
Square statistic (.xi), which makes minimal assumptions about the
underlying distributions. The primary requirement associated with the Chi-
Square test is that there are at least five theoretical frequencies
(observations) in each cell (cf., Cohen, 1969). This assumption is satisfied
as the total number of observations for dependent variables is high. Two
tailed tests for differences between means are employed, as the direction of
possible effects is not pre-specified.
Results concerning each of the three dimensions of problem finding are
reproduced in the following.
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5.4.1 PROBLEMSENSITIVITY
Table 5.1 reports the mean number of problem statements over groups.
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Table 5.1 Problem Sensitivity based on Alternative
Problem Conceptions-
PROBLEM
CONCEPrION
MEAN
(ST.DEV.)
N
Discrepancy 3.6543 81
(l.558)
Difficulty 4.0649 77
(1.664)
Decision 4.6835 (aXe) 79
(1.971)
Question 5.0732 (a)(bXe) 82
(2.047)
Opportunity 3.7407 81
(l.358)
Total 4.2450
(1.817)
400
F = 10.145, Df. = 4, P < .001
(a) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Discrepancy group (SchefT~'s test)
(b) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Difficulty group (Sche1f~'s test)
(8) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Opportunity group (Scheff~'s test)
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The table shows that subjects produced an average of 4.24 problem
statements. Thequestion conceptionresulted in the highest overall problem
sensitivity (mean 5.0732)ofall groups, whereas the discrepancy conception
resulted in the overall lowest problem sensitivity (mean 3.6543).
Results highlight that the conceptions of problems as :decisions and
questions resulted in higher problem sensitivity than the other problem
conceptions. The Decisiongroup produced a significantly higher number of
problem statements than the Discrepancy, Difficulty, and Opportunity
groups, whereas the Questions group produced a significantly higher
number ofproblem statements than the Discrepancy and Difficulty groups.
Estimates of statistical association (cf., Hays, 1973) indicate that
approximately 9.32% of the total variance is accounted for by different
problem conceptions. Observed differences exceed or approximate the
specified effectof interest with respect to all pairs of groups - except when
comparing the decision and difficulty groups.
In summary, results indicate that the conceptions of problems employed
significantly affect problem sensitivity.
5.4.2 LOCUSOF ATTENTION
The locusofattention in problem finding may be inspected by observing the
aggregated proportionofconstructs allocated to internal domains ofinquiry.
Table 5.2 reports the group means. Standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
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Table 5.2 The degree of Internal Locus of Attention based on
Alternative Problem Ooneeptions'
PROBLEM
CONCEPTION
MEAN
(ST.DEV.)
N
Discrepancy .7831 81
(.201)
Difficulty .7560 77
(.200)
Decision .9152 (.XbXe) 79
(.108)
Question .8723 (.Xb) 82
(.119)
Opportunity .8085 81
(.171)
Total .8274
(.174)
400
F = 12.451, Df. = 4, p < .001
(a) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Discrepancy group (Scheff~'s test)
(b) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Difficulty group (Scheff~'s test)
(e) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Opportunity group (Scheff~'s test)
: 'c,' ._:-,0l ..::u:...;"';l..t
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The table demonstrates that an average of 82.7% of constructs were
classified to various internal functions, and that the locus of attention is
internal, rather than external, for all groups. When examining the data,
however, it appears that the inclination to attend functional areas is the
highest based on the conceptions of problems as questions and decisions.
Significant differences are detected between the Decision group and the
Discrepancy, Difficulty, and Opportunity groups, respectively, and between
the Question group and the Discrepancy and Difficulty groups, respectively.
Estimates of statistical association indicate that approximately 11% of the
total variance is accounted for by different problem conceptions. Observed
differences exceed the specified effect of interest with respect to the groups
found significantly different - except when comparing the Question group
with the Discrepancy group.
In summary, obtained results suggest that different conceptions ofproblems
significantly affect to locus of attention in problem finding.
5.4.3 PATrERN OF INQUIRY
The analysis of data reveals significant differences between groups with
respect to five internal domains ofinquiry: Organization, Strategy, Finance,
Technology Development, and Production & Productline. Table 5.3 reports
observed means (proportion of constructs) for these domains, standard
deviations, and the significance offindings. (Complete response profiles for
each group are reproduced in Appendix D.)
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Table 5.3 The Pattern of Inquiry based on
Alternative Problem Conceptions
PROBLEM
CONCEPrION
ORGANI
-ZATION*
STRATEGy"· N
Discrepancy .0750 .0712 81
(.150) (.130)
Difficulty .1097 .0726 77
(.128) (.116)
Decision .2110 (a)(b) .1910 (a)(bXe) 79
(.171) (.194)
Question .1838 (a) .1392 82
(.141) (.120)
Opportunity .1407 .1071 81
(.127) (.120)
Total .1441
(.146)
.1163
(.127)
400
• F = 11.496, Df. = 4, P < .001
•• F = 10.144, Df. = 4, P < .001
(a) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Discrepancy group (Schem~'s test)
(b) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Difficulty group (SchefI~'s test)
(e) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Opportunity group (SchefI~'s test)
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Table 5.3 (cont.)
PROBLEM
CONCEPrION
TECHNOL.
DEV.·
PRODUCTION
& PROD.LINE··
N
Discrepancy .0239 .0534 81
(.071) (.105)
Difficulty .0175 .0363 77
(.044) (.080)
Decision .0221 .0665 79
(.057) (.131)
Question .0283 .0546 82
(.061) (.074)
Opportunity .0579 (b) .0908 (b) 81
(.097) (.108)
Total .0301
(.070)
.0605
(.103)
400
• F = 4.373, Df. = 4, P < .037
•• F = 3.104, Df. = 4, P < .032
(b) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Difficulty group (Scheff~'s test)
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Table 5.3 (cont.)
PROBLEM
CONCEPTION
FINANCE· N
Discrepancy .2765 (cXdXe) 81
(.193)
Difficulty .2046 (e) 77
(.165)
Decision .1603 79
(.173)
Question .1372 82
(.122)
Opportunity .0872 81
(.111)
Total .1728
(.168)
400
• F = 17.017, Df. = 4, P < .001
Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Decision group (Scheff~'s test)
(c)
(d) Denotes that the group is found significantly different
(p<.05) from the Question group (Scheff~'s test)
(e) Denotes that the group is fourid significantly different
(p<.05) from the Opportunity group (SchefT~'s test)
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Table 5.3 highlights a series of significant differences between groups.
First, results indicate that the domains Organization and Strategy were
attended the most based on the decision and question conceptions of
problems. Estimates suggest that approximately 10.5% of the variance in
the attention directed toward the domain Organization, and 9.3% of the
variance in the attention directed toward the domain Strategy is explained
by different problem conceptions.
Secondly, results suggest that the two domains Technology Development
and Production & Productline were attended the most by the subjects who
were presented with the opportunity conception of problems. Estimates of
statistical association indicate that approximately 5% of the variance in
attention directed toward Technology Development, and 3% of the variance
in the attention directed toward Production & Productline is accounted for
by different problem conceptions.
Thirdly, results highlight that the conception of problems as discrepancies
and difficulties resulted in the highest inquiry into the Finance domain.
Here, estimates indicate that approximately 14.7% of the variance is
accounted for by different problem conceptions.
In summary, results suggest that the conception of problems employed in
problem finding significantly affects the pattern ofinquiry.
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Results from the analyses, employing the Scheffå procedure and the Chi-
Square statistic, provide indications of the impact of different problem
conceptions at a high level of confidence. Results suggest that different
conception of problems significantly affect the three dimensions of problem
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finding investigated; problem sensitivity, the locus of attention, and the
pattern of inquiry.
The results also reveal certain patterns in the direction of effects indicating
underlying similarities and differences between alternative problem
conceptions. First, it appears that the conceptions of problems as decisions
and questions assemble one group or cluster. Subjects presented with any
of these two problem conceptions, exhibited higher problem sensitivity and
a stronger internal locus of attention than subjects presented with any of
the other conceptions of problems. This group of subjects also directed their
problem finding efforts more toward the domains Organization and Strategy
in comparison with the other groups.
The discrepancy and difficulty conceptions of problems appear to form a
second cluster. Subjects presented with any of these two conceptions of
problems, exhibited comparatively low problem sensitivity, and an
inclination toward higher externallocus of attention. This group of subjects
also attended the domain Finance to a higher extent than did the other
groups.
Based on the conception of problems as opportunities, in turn, a different
pattern is observed. The group of subjects presented with the opportunity
conception exhibited comparatively low problem sensitivity, in combination
with a relatively "balanced" locus of attention. With respect to the domain
Finance, the inquiry is the lowest of all groups, whereas with respect to the
domains Organization and Strategy, a comparatively average degree of
inquiry is observed. Based on the opportunity conception, however, subjects
inquired more into the domains Technology Development and Production &
Productline than did any of the other groups.
Hence, it appears that the five conceptions of problems form three clusters
in terms of their impact on the three dimensions of problem finding
investigated. Table 5.4 gives a simplified illustration of the three clusters.
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Table 5.4 Comparison of Problem Oonceptions'
PROBLEM
CONCEPT.
PROBLEM LOCUS OF
SENSITIVITY ATTENTION
INCREASED
FOCUS ON
Discrepancy
Low External
Difficulty
Decision
High Internal
Question
Opportunity BalancedLow
Finance
Organization
Strategy
Technology
Development
Production &
Productline
• Problem Sensitivity and Locus of Attention are indicated
in terms of comparative measures. The Domains Focused
denotes the domains for which the problem conception
produced a sigfiificant increase in attention.
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6 DISCUSSION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The findings suggest at a high level of confidence that the conception of
problems employed affects problem finding along the three dimensions:
problem sensitivity, locus of attention, and pattern of inquiry. Before
discussing the findings, however, we will consider the validity of the
present research along four dimensions: (1) statistical conclusion validity;
(2) internal validity; (3) construct validity ofputative causes and effects; and
(4) external validity. The four dimensions of validity are closely
interrelated. However, in the present research which is explorative in
orientation and primarily directed toward inductive theory generation,
statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, and construct validity are
of higher importance than external validity (Carmines and Zeller, 1979;
Cook and Campbell, 1979). After considering these critical dimensions of
validity, we will return to discuss possible interpretations and implications
of findings, as well as propose questions for further research.
6.2 VALIDITY
6.2.1 STATISTICALCONCLUSIONVALIDITY
Statistical conclusionvalidity refers to the approximate validity of results
based on the sensitivity and statistical power of the performed analyses.
Thus, it refers to whether it is reasonable to assume covariation between
variables given a specified levelofconfidenceand obtained variance between
groups (Cookand Campbell, 1979). Twoaspects are central in this respect:
(1) whether variables (presumed causes and effects) covary, and (2) how
strongly they covary.
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Results lend empirical support to covariation between presumed causes and
effects at a high level of confidence (alpha < .05), and the procedure
employed for multiple comparisons between groups, the Scheffå procedure,
is conservative in comparison with other eligible techniques (cf., Scheffe,
1959).
The strength of covariation is determined byestimates of statistical
association, which reflects the proportion of variance accounted for by the
independent variable (Cohen, 1969; Hays, 1973). Results indicate that
approximately 10-11% of the variance in problem sensitivity and the locus
of attention in problem finding is accounted for by different treatments.
With respect to the pattern ofinquiry in problem finding, estimates indicate
that from 3% to 15%of the variance is accounted for by treatments. In light
of the complexity and subtlety of the phenomena here undertaken for
investigation, and the explorative stage in which the present research is
positioned, the indicated statistical association reflects the presence of
effects at a considerable level of magnitude (cf., Cohen, 1969). The
obtained effect sizes furthermore indicate that the power of the performed
F-tests (reflecting the probability ofrejecting the null hypotheses when in
fact it should be rejected) meet the specified target level of 0.99.
In summary, procedures and estimates indicate that the statistical
conclusion validity of results is high, and that covariation between the
independent and dependent variables may be established.
6.2.2 INTERNAL VALIDITY
Although we have established that independent and dependent variables
covary, it remains to be determined whether we can infer that the observed
relationships are causal. Internal validity refers to the approximate validity
with which we can infer causal relationships between variables irrespective
of the constructs they are presumed to theoretically represent (Cook and
Campbell, 1979). In addition to observed covariance, the presumed cause
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needs to precede the assumed effects in time. In the present, experimental
design, treatments were introduced as task instructions prior to the
generation of responses. Hence, the direction of possible causal
relationships is established.
Nevertheless, a number of design-related threats to internal validity may
be identified. Random assignment of treatments as performed in the
present study, rules out a number ofthese; e.g. threats due to selection and
maturation. All subjects experienced the same testing conditions and
research instruments, which, in turn, reduces threats due to variations in
testing and instruments. Furthermore, as the employed design did not
involve classical pre- and post-tests, threats related to history, learning, and
differential mortality between groups may be ruled out. As a result, no
major threats to the internal validity of results are detected.
6.2.3 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF PUfATIVE
CAUSES AND EFFECTS
The construct validity of putative causes and effects refers to the
approximate validity with which we can generalize from the employed
research operations to the higher-order constructs of interest, i.e. to the fit
between cause and effect operations and their referent constructs (Cookand
Campbell, 1979). Following the advice of Cook and Campbell, efforts were
made at achieving high construct validity by: (1) pre-experimental
examination and differentiation of constructs in order to arrive at clear
definitions which were in conformity with the literature; (2) estimating the
success of treatment implementation, reflecting the degree to which the
independent variable was manipulated; and (3) careful attempts to develop
independent and dependent variables which measured the factors intended.
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Despite these efforts, however, several threats may be identified. The first
relates to mono-operation of independent and dependent variables. The
present study employs only one type of operations (treatments) to induce
different problem conceptions (the independent variable). Higher construct
validity might have been achieved by multiple sets of operations of the
independent variable, i.e. by alternative treatments based on each of the
five instances of the dependent variable (problem conceptions). Multiple
sets oftreatments would, however, require dramatic increases in the sample
size in order to sustain the level of significance specified.
With respect to the actual operations employed, it may be objected that
these refer to presumed different, and independent phenomena, i.e.
discrepancies, difficulties, decisions, opportunities, and questions,
respectively. As a result, one may argue, the observed differences in
response are plausible and inevitable. Similar to problems, however, these
phenomena are abstract, perceptual constructs, rather than objective
entities in their own right. Discrepancies, difficulties, decisions,
opportunities, and questions are also labels we assign to situations, and
fuzzy categories of events and situations as we perceive them. Hence, the
employed operations are not as rigorous as they may seem. Furthermore,
there is no theory to date which systematically explains or predicts
differences in the selectivity of attention based on either of these. Yet, a
more indirect way of imposing problem conceptions might have been
employed. Boland and Greenberg (1988) attempt to induce a metaphorical
framework through presenting subjects with a firm's imagined framework
of analysis and philosophy. A similar procedure is feasible with respect to
inducing different problem conceptions.
Multiple operations were employed, however, with respect to the stimulus
situation (ease material) presented to subjects as basis for problem finding.
The stimulus situation reflects the environmental determinant of problem
finding, and the alternation between two stimulus situations serves the
purpose of controlling for consistency of effects over situations.
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Another limitation of the employed operations is that they aim at only one
generic mode of problem finding; directed search as opposed to automatic
scanning for problems. In this generic mode, however, problem finding is
not differentiated accordingto the three modesproposedpreviously:problem
recognition, discovery, and creation. In contrast, the design involves
presenting subjects with a stimulus situation in which multiple cues with
varying degree of strength and ambiguity are imbedded. This approach is
chosen in order to simulate a realistic and complexenvironment ofproblem
finding, in which different modes of problem finding are likely to occur.
Another threat to the construct validity of causes and effects is the one of
mono-method bias. The present research utilizes standardized
presentations of manipulations and standardized means of recording
responses across measures, which may represent irrelevancies whose
influence is hard to dissociate from the influence of the independent
variable (cf., Cook and Campbell, 1979). In particular, the present
investigation involvedwritten representations ofthe stimulus situation and
treatments. Written representation of the stimulus situation may be
conceptualized as an indirect medium of problem finding, as opposed to
direct perception,whichmight lead to different results. Written information
constitutes, however, a major medium of communication in organizations,
and it has been argued that executives discover and interpret problems by
information provided by others rather than through direct perception
(Cowan, 1990).
A third plausible threat is the one of interaction between treatments. This
threat is ruled out, however, as systematic, statistical analyses detect no
interaction effects between treatments of any magnitude.
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6.2.4 EXTERNAL VALIDITY
External validity refers to the degree to which we can generalize inferred
relationships to and across different persons, settings, and times (Cook and-
Campbell, 1979). Three issues are of special importance to the degree to
which findings are generalizable; (1) the specific content area addressed; (2)
the sample of subjects employed; and (3) the level of findings considered.
The present investigation focuses on a specific content area; managerial
problem finding. The content area addressed is further limited by the case
material employed, in which private enterprises were depicted. Across to
stimulus situations within this content area, however, different problem
conceptions have been found to affect the three dimensions of problem
finding investigated; the problem sensitivity, the locus of attention, and the
pattern ofinquiry. The present investigation provides strong indications of
the presence of effects at a high level of confidence. Yet, when considering
the specific directions of effects in the pattern of inquiry across domains,
these refer specifically to the content area focused here, and cannot be
generalized directly to other areas of content. Hence, the findings need be
verified by further replications across different areas of content in which
managerial problem finding may occur.
The choice of a homogeneous group of subjects also affects the external
validity offindings, and the degree towhich the findings may be generalized
to the population of actual managers is of importance here. In order to
obtain an indication, the experiment was replicated with a group of 29
executives who attended an executive development program (The Solstrand
Program at the Center for Administrative Research, Bergen). The
executives represented a variety ofbusinesses, as well as public institutions,
and state owned industries. They were between 33 and 57 years old, and
had an average of 19 years ofwork experience. Results from the replication
with the sample of executives are reproduced in Appendix C. Due to the
insufficient sample size, however, no significant differences between groups
can be established at a high level of confidence.
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When consideringproblem sensitivity (cf.,Table C.l), the results correspond
to the previous findings in that the highest problem sensitivity resulted
from the question conception of problems (mean 5.7500 problem
statements), whereas the discrepancy and opportunity conceptionsproduced
the lowestproblem sensitivity (mean 4.4286problem statements). However,
the executives exhibited equally strong problem sensitivity based on the
difficulty and decision problem conceptions. This similarity between
findings is encouraging, yet the observed differences are smaller than in the
primary sample.
Interestingly, however, results indicate that the executives exhibited higher
problem sensitivity than the student subjects. The average executive stated
4.9 problems, in comparison to 4.2 problems by the average student subject.
This may indicate that problem sensitivity is affected by experience.
When considering the locus of attention (cf., Table C.2), findings indicate
that the conceptions of problems as decisions, questions, and opportunities
resulted in a higher intellhallocus of attention than did the conceptions of
problems as discrepancies and difficulties. The patterns of influence
observed appear to approximate the primary sample, but observed
differences are small. Yet, at the 0.10 level of confidence, significant
differences are detected between the difficulty group and the question,
decision, and opportunity group, respectively. Another interesting finding
here, is the indication that the executives exhibited a stronger internallocus
of attention than did the student subjects.
The pattern of inquiry in problem finding is reported with respect to the
internal domains for which significant differences were detected in the
primary sample (cf., Table C.3). The findings indicate that different
conception of problems affects the degree to which these domains are
attended. Although the findings do not entirely correspond with respect to
differences between groups, many important similarities are revealed.
First, results indicate that the discrepancy and difficulty conceptions
resulted in the lowest inquiry into the domains Organization and Strategy.
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Secondly, results suggest that the opportunity conception of problems
resulted in the highest inquiry into the domains Technology Development
and Production & Productline. Thirdly, results indicate that the
conceptions ofproblems as discrepancies and difficulties produce the highest
inquiry into the domain Finance.
In summary, findings from the replication with executives indicate that the
results obtained with student subjects may be generalized to executives.
The replication strongly suggests the presence of differences, as well as
important similarities in effects. The need for increased confidence in
generalization, however, calls for further replications across a larger sample
of executives. The ultimate way in which the external validity of the results
may be established, is by multiple replications across persons and stimulus
situations. In the present research, replications were performed at the
individual level by combining a between-subjects design with a within-
subject design. Replications should also be performed across studies, to
overcome limitations associated with mono-operation and mono~method
biases.
6.3 FINDINGS AND THEm INTERPRETATION
The present study investigated the impact of different conceptions of
problems on managerial problem finding. Problem finding was defined as
the processes by which we become aware of problems. Three dimensions of
problem finding were proposed: (1) problem-sensitivity, reflecting a
quantitative dimension of problem finding; (2) the locus of attention,
reflecting the allocation of attention between external and internal domains
; and (3) the pattern of inquiry, reflecting the allocation of attention over
different internal domains. Findings indicate that different conceptions of
problems produce significant differences In problem finding along the three
dimensions of problems finding investigated. As pointed out previously,
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however, there is no solid theoretical or empirical basis for proposing
reliable explanations to the observed differences. Yet, we may speculate
around possible explanation and underlying dynamics.
First, the three clusters of problem conceptions formed differ with respect
to their inherent connotation. The discrepancy-difficulty cluster has a
negative connotation, the decision-question cluster has a neutral
connotation, whereas the opportunity conceptionhas a positive connotation.
Based on this notion, the comparatively low problem sensitivity based on
the discrepancy and difficulty conceptions appears to be in correspondence
with crisis denial theory and threat rigidity theory (e.g.. Starbuck, Greve,
and Hedberg, 1978; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981);which predicts
that people tend to downplay or ignore perceived negative elements and
events and to exhibit avoidance and denial behavior when faced with such.
Followingthis line ofreasoning, however, one wouldexpect the opportunity
conception to result in comparatively high problem sensitivity.
Opportunities are typically perceived positive elements or events, based on
which we would expect no avoidance nor denial pattern. The findings
suggest, nevertheless, that based on the opportunity conception, subjects
exhibited comparatively low problem sensitivity.
Considering the decision-questioncluster, in turn, findings indicate that the
problem sensitivity is comparatively high. This might indicate that the
conceptionsof problems as decisions or questions are generative in Schon's
(1979) terms, i.e. that they stimulate broader and more numerous ideas
about problems (cf., Boland and Greenberg, 1988). In comparison with the
other problem conceptions, which have a positive or negative connotation,
the "neutral" problem conceptions appear to stimulate "less selective"
problem finding. This might reflect that both positive and negative
elements are attended to.
Discussion 94
When considering the locus of attention in problem finding, in turn, all
groups exhibit a strong internal locus of attention. Based on the crisis
denial theory, however, one would expect a higher inclination to an internal
rather than externaUocus of attention based on the problem conceptions
with a negative connotation. Based on the discrepancy or difficulty
conception, nevertheless, subjects exhibited an increased tendency to attend
the external environment. This finding is intriguing. Yet, when taking
attribution theory into account (cf., Kelly, 1967; Heider, 1958), the observed
tendency may be explained in terms of an inclination to attribute perceived
negative elements and events to the environment and to external conditions,
rather than to own behavior and actions.
Based on the decision and question conceptions of problems, in contrast,
a higher inclination toward an internallocus of attention is observed. The
internal environment is generally more controllable and offers more means
of solution under the control of the decision maker than the external
environment. Hence, this findings might imply that subjects presented with
the decision conception focus on the areas in which they may best exercise
control by decision making. This assumption is in correspondence with the
inherent solution orientation of the decision conception. Following this line
of reasoning in terms of the question conception, results suggest that
subjects tend to ask questions concerning possible actions, i.e. exhibit
solution orientation, rather than about the nature of problems. Further
inspection of the data offers support to this assumption.
Based on the opportunity conception, in turn, the locus of attention is
comparatively"balanced". Hence, subjects searched for opportunities in the
.environment as well as within the organization, however focusing on the
internal domains. This strongly implies that opportunities are viewed as
created as well as imbedded in the environment.
Finally, when considering the pattern of inquiry in problem finding, it
should be stressed that although subjects tended to demonstrate increased
inquiry into specific domains based on different problem conceptions,
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subjects did not overlook other domains (cf., complete response profiles
reproduced in Appendix D). Of primary interest here, however, are the
differences revealed. The observed increase in inquiry into the domain
Finance.based on the discrepancy and difficulty conceptions might imply
that discrepancies and difficulties are particularly salient within this
domain (cf., Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). Finance represents a domain in
which models for comparison are readily available through quantitative,
numeric information, e.g. historical models, planning models, and extra-
organizational models (cf., Pounds, 1969). In the domain Finance, there
might also be little ambiguity concerning the interpretation of elements as
problematic. Discrepancies of importance to the firm's performance are
easily identified in terms of financial data, yet there may be considerable
difficulty associated with their diagnosis and solution.
The observed increase in attention directed towards the domains
Organization and Strategy based on the decision and question conceptions,
however, are puzzling and most demanding to interpret. Considering the
opportunity conception, in contrast, based on which the domains Technology
Development and Production & Productline attract comparatively high
attention, findings appear more readily interpreted. The two domains
mirror the uniqueness and potential of the firm; they reflect the primary,
product related activities of the firm, and hence, the presumed legitimacy
of the firm's existence and its competitive advantages. Uniqueness and
novelty have been observed to represent central, perceptual characteristics
of opportunities (Jackson and Dutton, 1988).
In summary, many of the findings are hard to interpret. Hence, we have
attempted to speculate around possible interpretations, rather than to
propose definite explanations. Further research is called for in order to
explore the underlying dynamics accounting for the observed effects.
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6.4 POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS
In most reallife contexts, problem finding is not a goal in itself, but must
be seen in relation to succeeding problem solving activities, and to the
overall problem solving performance of the individual or organization. The
activities succeeding problem finding are not included in the present
investigation. Yet we will attempt to relate the findings obtained to
problem solving performance, and to propose some questions for further
investigation.
First, one may question the degree to which increased problem sensitivity
can be associated with improved overall problem solving performance.
Problem sensitivity represents a quantitative dimension of problem finding,
and increased problem sensitivity may be conceptualized as enhanced pro-
activity towards problems (cf., Larson et al., 1986). Clearly, however,
overall problem solving performance is not only associated with the quantity
of problems found, but with their quality in terms of adequacy and
relevance.
The issues of problem quantity and adequacy may be approached at several
levels of analysis. At the cognitive level of analysis, a negative relationship
has been observed between problem sensitivity and problem quality (Arlin,
1975-76; Artley et al., 1980). This finding might imply that subjects who
exhibit low problem sensitivity better identify problems of high adequacy
and relevance, than do subjects who exhibit high problem sensitivity. The
measures of problem quality employed, however, are rooted in cognitive
theory. At the individuallevel of analysis, problem adequacy can only be
reliably assessed by the problem owner. The perceived adequacy of a
problem may also be altered over time as a result of new knowledge about
developments and outcomes of actions, as well as by the appearance ofnew
problems.
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In the organizational context, the assessment of a given problem's adequacy
may be subject to conflict, and the time perspective on which to evaluate
problem solving performance may be ambiguous. Given limited resources,
however, it seems reasonable to assume that there will be a point at which
the marginal value of a new problem perceived based on a specific situation
becomes negative. Stated differently, increased problem sensitivity
becomes dysfunctional at the point when the amount of resources required
to handle the accumulated body of problems exceed the handling capacity
of the organization. Hence, the degree to which increased problem
sensitivity improves the overall organizational performance depends on the
number, magnitude, and composition of problems already identified and
legitimized in the organization. It remains to be explored, however, whether
organizations characterized by high performance tend to identify and attend
to a few problems of high magnitude, rather than a wide range of problems
with varying magnitude.
A recent investigation by D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990) demonstrates that
the locus of attention in managers may be related to organizational
performance. The degree to which the locus of attention required is internal
or external, however, is contingent on the situation. As some problem
conceptions appear to facilitate an externallocus of attention, whereas other
facilitate an internal locus of attention, one may infer that in order to
enlarge the capability of strategic adaption, managers should deliberately
alternate between specific problem conceptions and perspectives.
The pattern of inquiry in problem finding, in turn, has been found to affect
the range of solutions considered (Boland and Greenberg, 1988), and hence,
the possibilities of problem solving success. One may object, however, that
different problems require different solutions; for example, a finance
problem calls for different solutions than a marketing problem. The validity
of this argument, however, depends on the degree to which the locus of
attention and the pattern of inquiry in problem finding reflect selection
rather than attribution of problems. Due to the close interrelationship
between the different internal and external domains in which a firm
Discussion 98
operates, the classification of problems to single domains of inquiry tends
to be ambiguous (cf., Cowan, 1990; Porter, 1980,1985). It may thus prove
difficult to distinguish between identifying a sales problem, on the one hand,
and seeing a problem as a sales problem, on the other. The ambiguityof
this distinction is also associated with the strong interrelation between the
processes of selection and interpretation (cf., Neisser, 1976). Nevertheless,
when the same set of cues is interpreted as "a sales problem" by one person,
as "a product problem" by another, and as "a strategy problem" by a third
person, the range of solutions considered plausibly differ. Hence, it seems
apparent that "the problem" identified affects the possibilities of problem
solving success.
In summary, findings have plausible implications for overall problem solving
performance. The specific implications, however, are contingent on the
situation involved and call for further systematic investigation. Thus, as
the present study has been explorative in orientation, it has generated more
questions than answers.
6.5 FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
A series of important research questions remain to be explored, and
continued research directed at developing increased understanding of
problem finding in different contexts and at different levels of analysis is
called for. First, although the present research focuses on alternative
problem conceptions reflected in the literature, it remains to be investigated
whether people, in fact, hold different problem conceptions, and which are
the most common. The degree to which specific conceptions of problems are
stable across situations also needs to be explored. Results obtained from
the present investigation suggest that people shift easily between different
problem conceptions.
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Given that people easily shift between problem conceptions, there is a need
to identify factors which favor the choice of specific problem conceptions.
Wehave previously suggested the importance oflabelling effects (cf., Dutton
and Jackson, 1987). Other plausible factors are scripts, institutional norms,
and history.
Secondly,the results reveal certain patterns ofinfluence, which suggest that
some of the problem conceptionsproduce similar effects in problem finding
and possible are interrelated. We have proposed that the inherent
connotation of problem conceptions may represent one of the factors
accounting for the observed similarities and differences, and the possible
importance ofconnotation in metaphor and issue labelling should be subject
to further, systematic investigation.
Thirdly, the present investigation should be extended by investigating the
relationship between different problem conceptions and problem solving
success over time. Of special interest here is the question of whether
organizations characterized byhigh performance tend to employoneor some
problem conceptions rather than others.
The level at which problem finding is approached constitutes another
important issue. Very few empirical investigations have been conductedof
organizational problem findingin "real-life"contexts. Managers' perception
of the environment is generally assumed to form the basis for how the
organization senses and understands its environment (Bartunek, 1984;
Weick, 1979; Weick and Bougon, 1986). Among the important questions
calling for conceptual clarification and empirical investigation are: Which
are the modes of problem finding managers most typically involve in? .
Besides managers, who represent important problem finders in the
organization? And what is the compository relationship between problem
finding at the individual and organizational level of analysis?
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Perhaps most importantly, there is a need to address the question of how
organizations which perform successfully in conditions of high uncertainty
sense problems. This question reflects one of the most promising research
opportunities related to problem finding and problem solving performance.
What are the processesinvolved? Do managers learn problem finding skills
as they learn other types of skills? In order to investigate these questions
one may draw on a variety of literature, including, for example, the
literature on strategic issue analysis (e.g., Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, 1988;
Dutton and Jackson, 1987; El Sawy and Pauchant, 1988; King, 1982),
organizational frames of reference (e.g.,Shrivastava, 1980;Shrivastava and
Mitroff,1983),and (organizational) belief structures (e.g.Walsh, 1988;Walsh
and Fahey, 1986;Walsh et al., 1988).
6.6 SUMMARYAND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The very first processes of problem solving, the processes by which we
become aware of problems, are the least understood (Simon et al., 1987),
and the literature on problem finding is scarce. The point of departure for
the present study was the identification of five alternative, generic
conceptions of problems in the literature: problems as discrepancies,
problems as difficulties, problems as decisions, problems as questions, and
problems as opportunities for improvement. The explorative, empirical
investigation reveals that problem finding is significantly affected by
different problem conceptions along three important dimensions: problem
sensitivity, the locus of attention, and the pattern ofinquiry.
Among the factors which may possibly explain part of the observed effects
are: (1) differences in the inherent connotation of problem conceptions; (2)
differences among problem conceptionswith respect to the degree to which
they enhance solution versus problem orientation in problem finding, and
(3) general mechanisms and patterns of attribution. Further research is
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called for, however, in order to explore the underlying mechanisms
accounting for observed effects.
The three dimensions of problem finding investigated have apparent, yet
situation contingent, implications for problem solving performance. At a
general level, however, findings suggest that multiple and alternating
perspectives should be evoked when faced with a potentially problematic
situation in order to "optimize" problem sensitivity and the allocation of
attention over different domains of inquiry.
Due to the small body of relevant research, however, the present study has
been exploratory in orientation, and morequestions than answers have been
generated. There is a continued and pressing need to address a series of
research questions in order to provide a better understanding of the concept
problem and the very initial and critical phases of the problem solving
process. The findings of the present investigation and answers to the
questions outlined may help provide a better understanding of the complex
processes involved in problem finding at the individual and organizational
level, which, in turn, may contribute to a more integrated theory ofproblem
solving.
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I CLASSIFICATION FORM I
I SUBJECT I CASB I TREATMENT I I
GROUP / DOMAIN I CONTROCTS TOTAL
I MACRO ENVIRONMENT
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
TECHNICAL CONDITIONS
CULTURAL CONDITIONS
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
II MICRO ENVIRONMENT
REGULATIONS
MARKET
COMPETITION
SUPPLY
III INTERNAL FUNCTIONS
PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATION
STRATEGY
ECONOMY
R&D
PURCHASE
PRODUCTION/PRODUCT
DISTRIBUTION
MARKETING & SALES
TOTAL I CONTROCTS
I Ol'PROBLEM STATEMENTS
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An example ofresponse based on the discrepancies treatment is reproduced
below. The constructs elicited for coding are underlined. The classification
of constructs is reproduced on the next page.
1. Sales have not been as high as expected.
2. Turnover has increased but net profits are reduced. Hence, costs have
increased.
3. The firm has been unable topenetrate the commercial market. which,
in turn, may strongly affect sales. Since products are developed for
the commercial market. a major discrepancy is the one of not
succeeding on this market.
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I CLASSII'ICATION I'ORM I
I SUBJECT • 19 CASE • 2 TREATMENT • l I
GROUP I DOMAIN • CONTRUCTS TOTAL
I MACRO ENVIRONMENT O
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
TECHNICAL CONDITIONS
CULTURAL CONDITIONS
POLITICAL CONDITIONS
II MICRO ENVIRONMENT 2
REGULATIONS
MARKET 2
COMPETITION
SUPPLY
III INTERNAL FUNCTIONS 7
PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATION
STRATEGY
ECONOMY 2
R&D l
PURCHASE
PRODUCTION/PRODUCT l
DISTRIBUTION
MARKETING & SALES 3
TOTAL • CONTROCTS 9
• Ol'PROBLEM STATEMENTS 3
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Tables C.l through C.3 reproduce results from the sample of executives.
For comparison with results from the primary sample, see Table 5.1
through 5.3 in Chapter five.
Table c.i Problem Sensitivity based on
Alternative Problem Conceptions
PROBLEM
CONCEPTION
MEAN
(ST.DEV.)
N
Discrepancy 4.4286 14
(1.452)
Difficulty 4.9000 11
(2.282)
Decision 4.9000 11
(1.370)
Question 5.7500 12
(1.602)
Opportunity 4.7273 10
(1.009)
Total 4.9298
(1.590)
58
mean
(st.dev.)
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Table C.2 The degree of Internal Locus of Attention based on
Alternative Problem Conceptions
PROBLEM
CONCEPTION
MEAN
(ST.DEV.)
N
Discrepancy .8846
(.108)
Difficulty .8175
(.211)
Decision .9641
(.067)
Question .9653
(.067)
Opportunity .9607
(.086)
14
11
11
12
10
Total .9185
(.127)
58
mean
(st.dev.)
Appendix C ReBults (rom the Sample of Exeeutioee 119
Table C.3 The Pattern of Inquiry based on
Alternative Problem Conceptions
PROBLEM
CONCEPTION
ORGANI
-ZATION
STRATEGY N
Discrepancy .0817 .0942
(.130) (.111)
Difficulty .0377 .1383
(.091) (.164)
Decision .1010 .2009
(.145) (.163)
Question .1644 .1628
(.139) (.140)
Opportunity .1295 .2348
(.118) (.136)
14
11
11
12
10
Total .1035
(.130)
.1616
(.146)
58
mean
(st.dev.)
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Table C.S (cont.)
PROBLEM
CONCEPTION
TECHNOL.
DEV.
PRODUCTION N
& PROD.LINE
Discrepancy .0000 .0288
(.000) (.583)
Difficulty .0091 .0652
(.028) (.085)
Decision .0100 .1086
(.031) (.298)
Question .0119 .0905
(.041) (.167)
Opportunity .0253 .1086
(.057) (.104)
14
11
11
12
10
Total .0107
(.035)
.0776
(.161)
58
mean
(st.dev.)
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Table C.3 (cont.)
PROBLEM
CONCEPrION
FINANCE N
Discrepancy .2703 14
(.193)
Difficulty .2594 11
(.219)
Decision .1221 11
(.122)
Question .1821 12
(.125)
Opportunity .1598 10
(.123)
Total .2018
(.166)
58
mean
(st.dev.)
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Figure D.l Response Profile based on the Discrepancy
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Figure D.2 Response Profile based on the Difficulty
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Figure D.3 Response Profile based on the Decision
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Figure D.4 Response Profile based on the Question
Conception of Problems
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Figure D.S Response Profile based on the Opportunity
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